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Case No. 20141155-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff! Appellee, 
V. 
KEN MONTEY JOHNSON, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for one count of burglary, a second 
degree felony, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (West 2015). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2015). 
INTRODUCTION 
While drunk, Defendant kicked in the back doors of his ex-wife's home, 
took her cell phone as she called 911, yelled at her, and feinted punches at her 
face. He then threatened to push her down the stairs before leaving with her 
phone. 
Defendant admitted that he forcibly entered his ex-wife's home, took her 
phone, and fled. But he denied threatening her, and he argued that he did not 
commit burglary because he did not intend to keep the phone permanently, but 
took it only to stop his ex-wife from calling police. Although he admitted that 
he ultimately destroyed the phone, he claimed that he decided to do so only 
after seeing police at her home when he returned to give it back. The jury was 
mostly unpersuaded and convicted Defendant of burglary, but acquitted him of 
making a violent threat. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Jury Instruction 32 stated that to commit theft, Defendant had to take 
another's property II with a purpose to deprive him thereof"; it then red ted the 
statutory definition of "purpose to deprive" verbatim. 
Did the instructions correctly define II purpose to deprive?" 
Standard of Review. The accuracy of jury instructions are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Maama, 2015 UT App 235, if 29, 795 Utah Adv. Rep. 24. 
2. A week after the burglary, Defendant left a voicemail on his ex-wife's 
phone in which he admitted to breaking into her home. He also used the £-
word twice and sounded upset. 
Was the probative value of the voicemail substantially outweighed by 
any danger for unfair prejudice? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to admit or exclude specific 
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, ,r12, 
345 P.3d 1195. 
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3. When a recess took longer than expected, the trial court announced its 
intention to go to the jury room and explain the reasons for the delay. Defense 
counsel agreed to that plan. 
When the jury asked during deliberations to hear again recordings that 
had been admitted into evidence, the trial court explained that it would have 
the prosecutor show the bailiff how to play the recordings for the jury. Defense 
counsel did not object, and asked only that he be allowed to hear the 
prosecutor's instructions to the bailiff about how to play the recordings. 
Was trial counsel ineffective for agreeing to these jury contacts? 
Standard of Review. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the 
first time on appeal are reviewed for correctness. State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ,Il6, 
247 P.3d 344. 
4. After defense counsel repeatedly used the victim's written witness 
statement on cross-examination to show that it did not contain some of the 
details that she had testified to, the trial court admitted the entire one-
paragraph statement as a prior consistent statement under rule 801(d)(1)(B), 
Utah Rules of Evidence, and under the rule of completeness in rule 106, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ruling that fairness required 
admitting the victim's entire witness statement? 
-3-
Standard of Review. See Issue 2. 
5. Does the cumulative error doctrine apply where Defendant 
demonstrates no error, or at most one harmless error? 
Standard of Review. None applies. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains: 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (West 2015) (burglary); 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-401 (West 2015) (definitions for theft); 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (West 2015) (theft); 
Utah R. Evid. 106; 
Utah R. Evid. 403; 
Utah R. Evid. 801. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 1 
Defendant left a voice message for his ex-wife, Barbara Johnson, warning 
that he was headed to her home and demanding that she "talk to him." 
R347:83,86. Defendant II sounded extremely drunk" and was "slurring his 
words." R347:86-87. Within a II few minutes" of listening to the message, 
Barbara heard a pounding on her back glass doors and saw Defendant 
repeatedly kicking them. R347:87-88. 
1 According to well-established appellate standards, the State recites the 
facts in the light most favorable to the verdict and presents conflicting evidence 
only when necessary to understand the appellate issues. See State v. Heaps, 2005 
UT 5, i[2, 999 P.2d 565. 
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When the door frame broke, Defendant entered Barbara's home 
screaming and yelling. R347:88,93. Barbara dialed 911 on her cell phone, but 
accidentally hung up because she was scared and "shaking like crazy." 
R347:88-89. When the 911 operator called back, Defendant grabbed the phone 
from Barbara's hand, feinted punches to her face, and continued to yell in 
slurred words that he had to talk to her. R347:89-90. 
Defendant then headed for the front door with Barbara's phone. R347:90. 
Barbara followed, grabbing for her phone and begging Defendant to return it. 
R347:90,140. As the two stood on the landing at the front door of the split-level 
home, Defendant grabbed Barbara and threatened, "I should throw you down 
the stairs right now." R347:91. Barbara retreated and Defendant fled out the 
door and sped off in his truck. R347:91-92. 
Defendant's version 
Defendant testified that he went to Barbara's home because he wanted to 
talk to her about a debt that he believed she owed him under their divorce 
decree. R347:119-21;R348:22-23. Defendant admitted to kicking in the doors, 
entering Barbara's home, taking her cellphone, and leaving with the phone. 
R348:23-25. But he said that he never touched or threatened Barbara while in 
her home. R348:28-29. He also said that he took her phone only to stop her 
from calling police. R348:25-26. Defendant claimed that he went back an hour 
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later to return the phone, but that he got upset and smashed it when he saw 
police at Barbara's house. R348:25-26. 
Defendant told the jury that he pied guilty to a charge of interrupting a 
communications device because he took Barbara's phone to prevent her from 
calling police. R348:24. He also admitted that he pied guilty to a theft charge 
because he destroyed Barbara's phone. R348:25-28. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
The State charged Defendant with one count each of: 
R206-08. 
burglary, a second degree felony, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 
(West 2015); 
damaging or interrupting a communication device, a class B 
misdemeanor, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-108 (West 2015); 
making a threat of violence, a class B misdemeanor, Utah Code 
Ann. §76-5-107 (West 2015); and 
theft, a class B misdemeanor, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (West 
2015). 
On the day of trial, Defendant pied guilty to the interrupting a 
communication device and theft charges. R230-32. A jury convicted Defendant 
of burglary, but acquitted him of making a violent threat. R247,297. He appeals 
only his burglary conviction. Br.Aplt. 1-3, 50. 
The trial court sentenced Defendant to prison for one to fifteen years on 
the burglary count and to two jail terms of 180 days on the misdemeanor 
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counts. R315-16. The trial court suspended the prison and jail terms and placed 
Defendant on probation for 36 months, granted him credit for the 102 days he 
had already served, and released him. R315-16. Defendant timely appealed. 
R317. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Defendant argues that the jury instructions did not clearly explain that 
to be guilty of burglary based on the intent to commit theft, he had to enter or 
remain in Barbara's home with the intent to permanently deprive her of her 
cellphone. Defendant concedes that the instructions required the jury to find 
that he entered or remained in Barbara's home with the specific intent to 
commit a theft, but argues that the instructions did not clearly explain that theft 
requires intent to permanently deprive another of her property. 
On the contrary, the instructions explained that theft required Defendant 
to act with the "purpose to deprive" Barbara of her cellphone, and then quoted 
the statutory definition of II purpose to deprive." That definition explained that 
11 purpose to deprive" included intending to permanently deprive another of her 
property. And the remainder of the definition precluded the jury from finding 
Defendant guilty of a theft-based burglary charge if it found that he intended to 
keep her phone only temporarily. 
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At defense counsel's request, the court also instructed the jury on the 
elements of wrongful appropriation- which requires only an intent to 
temporarily deprive another of her property. Contrary to Defendant's 
assertion, the trial court was not required to repeat in that instruction the 
principle that theft required an intent to permanently deprive, because other 
instructions had already explained that principle. 
Defendant argues that the trial court's answers to the jury's questions 
during deliberations mislead the jury regarding the elements of burglary. He is 
mistaken. When the jury asked whether Defendant had to possess the intent to 
commit a theft before he entered the home, the court correctly explained that 
Defendant could form that intent either before entry, or while remaining in the 
home. When the jury asked why the elements of wrongful appropriation were 
included in the instructions, the trial court correctly told the jury to answer that 
question for themselves. Contrary to Defendant's assertion, the trial court was 
not required to repeat that theft required intent to permanently deprive. 
II. Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously admitted under rule 
403, Utah Rules of Evidence, a 41-second clip of a voicemail that Defendant left 
for Barbara a week after the burglary. In that clip, Defendant admits to 
breaking into Barbara's home. He also uses the £-word twice and sounds upset. 
Any potential for unfair prejudice from this clip did not substantially outweigh 
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its probative value. Rule 403 presumes admissibility. Here, Defendant 
admitted to key elements of burglary in the voicemail, and the fact that he was 
upset with Barbara tended to prove that he broke into her home intending to 
threaten or to steal from her, or both. His use of the £-word twice did not create 
the potential for unfair prejudice. 
III. Defendant argues that the trial court had improper contact with the 
jury when, outside of counsel's and defendant's presence, it explained why a 
recess was taking longer than expected. He also argues that the bailiff had 
improper contact with the jury when the bailiff replayed during deliberations 
recordings (Barbara's 911 call and the clip of Defendant's voicemail) that had 
been admitted into evidence. Defendant did not preserve either argument and 
in fact invited any error by agreeing to both jury contacts. This Court therefore 
may not review this issue for plain error. 
Defendant cannot show that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting 
to the contacts because conceivable strategic reasons explain the lack of 
objections. By allowing the trial court to explain the delay to the jury, counsel 
reduced the likelihood that the jury would become frustrated with the 
proceedings and irritated with counsel. Counsel also could have reasonably 
concluded that the court's discussion of scheduling matters with the jury would 
be an innocuous interaction. And allowing the bailiff to supervise replaying the 
-9-
recordings ensured that the jury would not hear portions of Defendant's 
voicemail that counsel had successfully excluded. For these same reasons, 
Defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's lack of 
objection. 
IV. Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting the victim's one-paragraph witness statement (1) under the rule of 
completeness found in rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence; and (2) as a prior 
consistent statement under rule 801 ( d)(l )(B), Utah Rules of Evidence, as 
interpreted in State v. Bujan. The trial court properly admitted the statement 
under rule 106. That rule allows for admitting the parts of a written statement 
that, in fairness, are required to explain previously referred to portions. 
During cross-examination, defense counsel repeatedly referred to 
Barbara's witness statement to show that it did not contain some of the details 
in her testimony. This tactic called into question Barbara's ability to accurately 
report the event. It also suggested that Barbara was embellishing her testimony 
because her witness statement alone did not fully support Defendant's charges. 
The trial court therefore acted well within its discretion in finding that fairness 
required that the jury see the entire witness statement. This allowed the jury to 
gauge her ability to accurately report the events. It also allowed them to 
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determine whether the statement alone contained sufficient detail to support 
Defendant's charges. 
But even if the statement were erroneously admitted under rule 106, any 
error was harmless. Barbara testified to almost all of the details in her written 
statement and Defendant corroborated most of Barbara's testimony. Moreover, 
Defendant's basis for arguing that Barbara fabricated here statement was weak 
because she stood to gain nothing by doing so. His conviction would not 
relieve her of any debt she owed him under the divorce decree. 
Defendant did not preserve his argument that the statement was 
inadmissible under rule 801(d)(1)(B) as interpreted in State v. Bujan. Defendant 
argues that the trial court plainly erred for not sua sponte raising, and that his 
counsel was ineffective for not making, this argument. But even assuming that 
Defendant could show obvious error or deficient performance, he cannot show 
the required prejudice under either theory because the witness statement was 
independently admissible under rule 106, and even if it was not, any error in 
admitting it under that rule was harmless. 
V. Defendant argues that the cumulative error doctrine entitles him to 
relief. But because no error occurred, or at most only one harmless error 




THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
THAT TO COMMIT A BURGLARY BASED ON INTENT TO 
COMMIT A THEFT, DEFENDANT HAD TO INTEND TO 
PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE THE VICTIM OF HER PROPERTY 
Defendant argues that the jury instructions on burglary were "inadequate 
and misleading" because they did not explain that "burglary by theft requires 
proof that the defendant entered/remained with the purpose to permanently 
deprive" another of her property. Br.Aplt. 10, 13 (holding and capitalization 
omitted). According to Defendant, the instructions suggested that "the intent to 
temporarily deprive was sufficient to convict." Br.Aplt. 13. Although 
Instruction 32 recited verbatim the statutory definition of "purpose to deprive," 
R280, Defendant argues that this definition was "insufficient" because it was an 
"abstract definition" that did not explain that this was the "critical element" 
that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Br.Aplt. 15. 
The instructions correctly explained the law. Contrary to Defendant's 
argument, if the jury had believed his version of events, the instructions 
prohibited them from convicting him of burglary. 
This Court reviews jury instructions uin their entirety and will affirm 
when the instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the case." State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ,r148, 299 P.3d 892 
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I~ 
(quotation and citation omitted). "Instructions should be read in their entire 
context and given meaning in accordance with the ordinary and usual import of 
the language as it would be understood by lay jurors." State v. Kennedy, 2015 
UT App 152, if 28, 354 P.3d 775 ( quotation and citation omitted). 
A. The jury instructions correctly explained the elements of 
burglary. 
Before the jury could convict Defendant of burglary based on an intent to 
commit a theft, the instructions required it to find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he intended to permanently deprive Barbara of her cellphone. They also 
required the jury to find that Defendant possessed that intent when he either 
entered or remained unlawfully in her home. 
Instruction 28 listed the elements of burglary. R276 (Addendum B is a 
copy of the relevant instructions). It told the jury that it could not convict 
unless it found "beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 
1. In Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant KEN JOHNSON; 
2. Knowingly, intentionally or recklessly; 
3. Entered or remained unlawfully in the dwelling of another; and 
4. With the specific intent to commit: 
a. A theft; or 
b. An assault on any person. 
R276. Thus, to convict based on an intent to commit theft, Instruction 28 
required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had the 
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"specific intent" to commit theft when he entered or remained unlawfully in 
Barbara's home. 2 R276. 
Instruction 32 defined the elements of theft. R280. It explained that to 
commit theft, one must obtain or exercise "unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof." R280. Instruction 
32 then quoted the statutory definition of "Purpose to deprive," which includes 
having "the conscious object: (a) To withhold property permanently or for so 
extended a period or to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion 
of its economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost." 3 R280. 
2 Instruction 31 reiterated that "a person commits Burglary if that person 
enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling or any portion of a dwelling with 
intent to commit a felony or theft or to commit an assault on any person." R279. 
As the trial court read the instructions to the jury, it explained that the jury 
could "cross ... off" the words "a felony" because that "isn't the situation here 
... in this case we're talking about theft or assault." R348:70-71. The striking 
out of the word "commit" and the failure to strike out the following "or" 
therefore appears to be a slip of the pen. 
3 This part of Instruction 32 stated in its entirety: "'Purpose to deprive' 
means to have the conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period 
or to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its 
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost. 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation; or 
(c) to dispose of the property under circumstances that make it 
unlikely that the owner will recover it." 
R280 (quoting Utah Code Ann. §76-6-401(3) (West 2015)). 
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• . ..) 
Read together, these instructions explained that the jury could convict 
Defendant of a burglary based on the intent to commit theft only if it found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to "withhold [Barbara's] property 
permanently." R280 (Instruction 32). By explicitly defining "purpose to 
deprive" to require this mental state, Instruction 32 alerted the jury that this 
was a "critical element" of theft, which in turn became a "critical element" of 
burglary under Instruction 28. R276,280. 
The instructions also explained that the jury had to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Defendant formed the intent to permanently deprive 
when he "[e]ntered or remained unlawfully" in Barbara's home. R276 
(Instruction 28). As Defendant concedes, "Instruction 28 correctly told the 
jury that burglary required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant 
entered/remained with the 'specific intent to commit a theft."' Br.Aplt. 15. If 
the jury therefore believed Defendant's testimony that he took Barbara's 
cellphone only because he intended to keep her from calling the police, and that 
he intended to return it to her shortly thereafter, the instructions prohibited the 
jury from finding that Defendant entered or remained in Barbara's home with 
the intent to commit theft. And if the jury could not find that Defendant 
intended to commit theft, then the instructions also prohibited the jury from 
convicting Defendant of burglary based on that theory. As defense counsel 
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argued, the "key facts" were Defendant's "mental intent ... when he entered the 
place and what his mental intent was when he was in the place." R348:87. 
Defendant suggests that an instruction that quotes the statutory language 
is insufficient because it provides only an "abstract definition." Br.A pit. 15. But 
quoting the statutory definition of a legal term is a perfectly acceptable way to 
instruct the jury. See State v. Clark, 2014 UT App 56, if52, 322 P.3d 761 
(accomplice liability instruction that "copied nearly verbatim" from statute 
"adequately instructed" jury); State v. Augustine, 2013 UT App 61, iflO, 298 P.3d 
693 (accomplice liability instruction that quoted statute verbatim was adequate). 
When the jury must understand the meaning of a statutory term like "purpose 
to deprive," and the statute defines that term, the trial court cannot be faulted 
for concluding that the most accurate way to explain the term is to quote the 
statutory definition. 
Defendant also argues that the instructions were unclear because they did 
not "distinguish between the general and specific intent requirements." 
Br.Aplt. 15. In support, Defendant cites Instruction 25, which generally 
explained that one acts "intentionally" when it is his "conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Br.Aplt. 15; R273. Isolating 
this language, Defendant argues that it "might have led the jury to believe that 
'intent to commit theft' could be satisfied by mere proof of the intent to 
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unlawfully take" Barbara's cellphone, not the intent to keep it permanently. 
Br.Aplt. 15. 
But jury instructions must be read as a whole and as they would be 
understood by lay jurors. Kennedy, 2015 UT App 152, if 28. Even though 
Instruction 24 defined the mental state of "intentionally" in general terms, 
Instruction 28- the burglary elements instruction - unambiguously required 
the jury to find that Defendant acted with "the specific intent to commit ... [a] 
theft." R276 ( emphasis added). A lay juror would have understood this 
language to require that it could find Defendant guilty of burglary only if it first 
found that he intended to commit theft, which, as explained, required that he 
intend to permanently take Barbara's phone. R276,280. 
Defendant argues that Instruction 33, defining wrongful appropriation, 
"suggested that intent to temporarily deprive was sufficient to sustain a 
conviction." Br.Aplt. 17. Defendant argues that Instruction 33 was confusing 
because it did not tell the jury that intent to temporarily deprive was 
insufficient to establish burglary. Br.Aplt. 18. 
But it was at defense counsel's request that the trial court instructed the 
jury on the elements of wrongful appropriation, which requires only a 
temporary taking of another's property. R348:51-53. Instruction 33 explained 
that a wrongful appropriation occurs when one takes another's property 
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without consent "and with intent to temporarily appropriate, possess, or use 
the property or to temporarily deprive the owner or legal custodian of 
possession of the property." R281. 
Counsel also requested that this instruction include a lengthy 
commentary explaining Defendant's "theory of the case" and reiterating that if 
the jury found that he intended to keep Barbara's cellphone only temporarily, 
then he could not be guilty of theft-or a burglary based on an intent to commit 
theft-because an "intention to temporarily deprive the person of the property 
is not sufficient to support a burglary charge." R348:51-53;R360-61. 
The trial court granted counsel's request to instruct the jury on the 
elements of wrongful appropriation, but declined to include the requested 
commentary explaining Defendant's "theory of the case." R348:51-53. The 
court stated that counsel would "have to make [his] own arguments" to the jury 
about how the elements of theft and wrongful appropriation applied to the 
facts. R348:52-53. After the trial court refused to include counsel's requested 
commentary, counsel did not ask to withdraw the instruction. R348:52-53. 
Defendant argues that Instruction 33 should have told the jury that intent 
to temporarily deprive was insufficient to establish burglary. Br.Aplt. 17-18. 
But as explained, Instruction 32 already told the jury that. R280. A trial court 
does not err in refusing to give a proposed instruction "if the point is properly 
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covered in other instructions." State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ~148, 299 P.3d 892; 
see also State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643, 647 (Utah 1982) ("It is not error to refuse a 
proposed instruction if the point is properly covered in the other instructions."). 
Although a "defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on the defense's 
theory of the case," he "is not entitled to further instruction" on his theory 
"when the other instructions already fairly instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to that theory." Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ,32. "Jury instructions require 
no particular form so long as they accurately convey the law." State v. Maama, 
2015 UT App 235, ,29, 795 Utah Adv. Rep. 24. Thus, a defendant "is not 
entitled to have the jury instructed with any particular wording." State v. 
Marchet, 2012 UT App 197, ifl7, 284 P.3d 668. Because Instruction 32 already 
explained that intent to temporarily deprive was insufficient, the court was not 
required to repeat that concept in other instructions. 4 
4 Defendant does not argue that his counsel was ineffective for proposing 
the wrongful appropriation instruction, or for not asking to withdraw it after 
the court refused to give his entire proposed instruction. But even if Defendant 
had made that argument, he could not prove that his counsel performed 
deficiently because his counsel had a legitimate strategic reason for requesting 
the instruction. As the trial court recognized, counsel wanted the jury to 
understand that an intent to temporarily deprive amounted only to wrongful 
appropriation, "so he can claim that was the intent he performed while he was 
inside rather than" the intent to commit a theft. R348:51. As counsel argued in 
closing, as Defendant left Barbara's home, "he never intended to permanently 
keep [her] phone]." R348:90,94. 
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B. The trial court did not give misleading responses to the jury's 
questions. 
Defendant argues that the trial court gave misleading responses to two 
questions that the jury posed during deliberations. Br.Aplt. 16-17, 18. 
During deliberations, the jury asked two questions. R249,251 
(Addendum C is a copy of the questions with the court's answers). The first 
asked: 
We have a question regarding intent. p.#28-4. 
Does the person need to have intent before they 
enter the home to commit[t] theft OR can intent 
happen after they are in the home? 
R249. The trial court responded: 
R249. 5 
See instruction #31[.] Intent can be formed before 
entry or while remaining in the home. 
The second question asked: 
Jury is confused about the reason for the addition 
of p.33[.] 
Is there a specific reason it is included? 
5 As explained, Instruction 31 stated, "a person commits Burglary if that 
person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling or any portion of a dwelling 





R251. The trial court responded: 
Use your collective memory of counsels['] 
argument/ and testimony to determine its 
significance. 
See Instruction #11. 
R251. Instruction 11 explained that all of the jury instructions were important, 
that the jury should consider them as a whole, and that whether "any particular 
instruction applies may depend upon what you decide are the true facts of the 
case." R259. 
After the jury reached its verdict, but before bringing the jury in to the 
courtroom, the court explained to counsel that the jury had asked two questions 
and that the court had answered them as stated above. R348:100-02. Defense 
counsel objected only to the court's answer about the significance of Instruction 
33 on wrongful appropriation. R348:100-02. He argued that in addition to the 
answer the court gave, it should have added that Defendant's "theory of the 
case is that he only wanted to temporarily deprive." R348:102. The court 
overruled the objection. R348:102. 
1. Defendant did not preserve his challenge to the court's answer 
regarding when he had to form the required mental state, and 
he has not shown plain error or ineffective assistance. 
Defendant argues that the court's answer to the jury's first question 
misled them about when he was required to form the specific intent necessary 
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for burglary. Br.Aplt. 16-17. He acknowledges that Instruction 28 explained 
that "the entering/remaining had to be 'with' 'the specific intent to commit 
theft."' Br.Aplt. 16 ( quoting R276). But he argues that the court's response that 
intent "can be formed before entry or while remaining in the home" "suggested 
that intent could be formed after leaving the home," because the court used the 
non-mandatory term "can," instead of "must." Br.Aplt. 16-17. 
Defendant did not preserve this argument. To "preserve an issue for 
appeal, a defendant must raise the issue before the district court in such a way 
that the court is placed on notice of potential error and then has the opportunity 
to correct or avoid the error." State v. Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT App 219, ,r10, 189 
P.3d 85 (emphasis added). This generally requires a party to make "a timely 
and specific objection" in the trial court. State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ,I17, 192 P.3d 
867 (quotation and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). An appellate 
argument is not preserved unless the objection below was based on the same 
grounds as the appellate argument. See id. 
Defendant did not object to the trial court's answer to the jury's first 
question. R348:100-02. He therefore did not preserve his appellate challenge to 
that answer. 
Defendant argues broadly that if "any aspect" of his appellate argument 
is unpreserved, then his counsel was ineffective for not making the argument 
-22-
and the trial court plainly erred for not sua sponte recognizing it. Br.Aplt. 24-
27. "To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that (1) the trial 
court committed error, (2) the error should have been obvious to the court, and 
(3) the error prejudiced the defendant." State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, if 28, 354 
P.3d 791. 
To prove that his counsel was ineffective, Defendant must prove both 
that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance 
prejudiced him. See Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, if27, 194 P.3d 913 (citing Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Counsel performs deficiently only 
when his performance is objectively unreasonable. Id. if 28. Deficient 
performance is prejudicial only when there is "'a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different."' Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). The plain error and 
ineffective assistance of counsel standards "share a common standard of 
prejudice." State v. McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, if 42, 302 P.3d 844. 
Defendant cannot show any error, let alone obvious, prejudicial error 
because the court's answer did not mislead the jury. The jury's question shows 
that it was not considering whether it could find Defendant guilty if he formed 
the mental state only after leaving the home. Rather, its concern was whether 
he had to possess the mental state "before" entering. R249. Nothing in the 
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jury's question suggested any confusion about whether Defendant could form 
the required mental state after leaving the home. There was therefore no reason 
for the trial court to address this non-existent concern, or for counsel to insist 
that the trial court do so. 
Moreover, as Defendant acknowledges, Instruction 28 informed the jury 
that the required mental state had to exist contemporaneously with either the 
entering or the remaining. Br.Aplt. 16; R276. Instruction 31 reinforced this fact. 
R279. When the lay jurors read these instructions together with the trial court's 
answer, they would not have understood the answer to allow them to find 
Defendant guilty if he did not form the specific intent to commit theft until after 
he left Barbara's home. Thus, there was nothing misleading about the trial 
court's answer. And even if there were, any error was neither obvious, nor 
prejudicial. Defendant therefore cannot show either that the trial court plainly 
erred, or that his counsel was ineffective, in addressing the jury's first question. 
2. The trial court correctly responded to the jury's question about 
the significance of Instruction 33 on wrongful appropriation. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court gave a "problematic" response 
to the jury's question about Instruction 33 on wrongful appropriation. Br.Aplt. 
18. Rather than merely telling the jury to decide the significance of Instruction 
33 for themselves, Defendant argues that the court should have also responded 
"that the intent to temporarily deprive was insufficient to support a 
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conviction." Br.Aplt. 18. But the court had already explained that principle to 
the jury in Instruction 32, which defined the "purpose to deprive" element of 
theft. R280. The trial court was not required to reiterate that point. See Maestas, 
2012 UT 46, ,I148. The trial court's answer was therefore not misleading. 
In sum, the instructions correctly explained the elements of burglary and 
the trial court's answers to the jury's questions did not confuse that explanation. 
Defendant therefore cannot show error in the jury instructions. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WELL WITHIN ITS DISCRETION 
IN ADMITTING A 41-SECOND CLIP OF A VOICEMAIL IN 
WHICH DEFENDANT ADMITTED TO BREAKING INTO THE 
VICTIM'S HOME 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion under rule 403, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, "by admitting an unfairly prejudicial recording" of a 
voicemail that Defendant left on Barbara's phone in which he admitted to 
breaking into her home. Br.Aplt. 27. Defendant argues that the brief recording 
"was substantially more prejudicial than probative" because Defendant twice 
used the £-word and "exhibited extreme animosity" towards Barbara. Br.Aplt. 
27, 28-29. 
At trial, the prosecutor moved to admit an almost-four-minute voicemail 
that Defendant left on Barbara's phone about a week after the burglary. 
R347:1,107,113-15; State's Exhibit (SE) #5 (audio CD). Much of the recording is 
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unintelligible, but the intelligible portions include Defendant's admission that 
he broke into Barbara's home. SE#S at 9:27-9:30. Counsel conceded that the 
prosecution could play the four seconds of the voicemail in which Defendant 
admitted to breaking into Barbara's home. R347:109. But counsel objected that 
the entire recording was unfairly prejudicial because it contained obscenities 
and "vindictive" statements. R347:109. Instead of playing the voicemail, 
counsel offered to stipulate that Defendant kicked in Barbara's door and 
forcibly entered her home. R347:108-110. 
When the prosecutor insisted on playing the voicemail, the trial court 
ruled that it would "allow the part where he discusses coming into the house" 
but would not allow the jury to hear the entire voicemail. R347:110. When the 
prosecutor explained that it would be difficult to cue the recording at that exact 
point, the court allowed the prosecutor to "start at the beginning," noting that 
much of the initial statements were "hard to understand." R347:111. 
The jury heard the first 41 seconds of the voicemail (from 9:30 to 10:11 on 
the CD). R347:114-15; SE#S. Although Defendant is difficult to understand, he 
can be heard saying, "there's nothing I owe you," "you' re fucking me," and 
"they can arrest me for breaking and entering ... whatever the fuck they think 
... for you stealing my house from me." SE#S at 9:30-10:11. 
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At a later sidebar, defense counsel moved for a mistrial "because the 
prosecutor didn't play just the four seconds of 'I entered the place'" but allowed 
the jury to hear Defendant using the £-word. R347:137,145-46. The trial court 
refused to grant a mistrial merely "because the £-word might have been heard 
along with [Defendant's] statements about kicking the door in." R347:146-47. 
A trial court may exclude evidence under rule 403 "if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice." Utah R. Evid. 
403. "[U]nfair prejudice results only where the evidence has an undue 
tendency to suggest decision upon an improper basis." State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 
15, 132, 328 P.3d 841 (quotation and citation omitted). ''Given this bar," Utah 
courts "indulge a presumption in favor of admissibility." Id. (quotation and 
citation omitted). 
Defendant argues that the trial court should have excluded the voicemail 
under rule 403 because it "was substantially more prejudicial than probative." 
Br.Aplt. 27. Defendant argues that "the probative value of the voicemail was 
low" because he later testified and admitted breaking into the home, and 
because he had earlier agreed to stipulate that he broke into the home. Br.Aplt. 
29. Defendant argues that the danger for unfair prejudice was high because 
Defendant used the £-word twice and "exhibited extreme animosity" towards 
Barbara. Br.Aplt. 27, 28-29. 
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The trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the brief 
recording. First, the recording had substantial probative value. Evidence is 
relevant II if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401(a). The recording was 
relevant here because it allowed the jury to hear Defendant admit that he broke 
into Barbara's home. This was a key element of the burglary charge. See Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-202. 
The recording also allowed the jury to get a sense of Defendant's 
animosity towards Barbara. The fact that Defendant was still hostile towards 
Barbara a week after the burglary made it more likely that he had entered or 
remained in her home with the intent to assault or to steal from her. 
The brief part of the recording preceding Defendant's admission was also 
relevant to put that admission in context. See State v. Labrum, 2014 UT App 5, 
if 22, 318 P.3d 1151 (holding that II other acts evidence may be admissible under 
rule 404(b) to show context"). The prosecution has "the right to present 
evidence with broad 'narrative value' beyond the establishment of particular 
elements of a crime." State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, if28, 296 P.3d 673. 
Defendant's later testimony that he broke into Barbara's home did not 




recording during his case-in-chief, there was no guarantee that Defendant 
would take the stand and admit to breaking into Barbara's home. 
Nor did Defendant's offer to stipulate negate the recording's probative 
value. The "prosecution retains wide discretion to reject such an offer." Verde, 
2012 UT 60, 128. This is because '"a naked proposition in a courtroom may be 
no match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove it."' Id. (quoting 
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 189 (1997)). A "prosecutor may not be 
compelled to accept a stipulation as to an element of a crime since a colorless 
admission by the opponent may sometimes have the effect of depriving the 
party of the legitimate moral force of his evidence." State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 
455 (Utah 1989) (quotations and citations omitted). 
The substantial probative value of Defendant's voicemail was not 
"substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice." Utah R. Evid. 
403. Defendant's use of the £-word twice did not have "an undue tendency to 
suggest decision upon an improper basis," Lucero, 2014 UT 15, iJ32, because that 
word has "lost much of [its] shock value in contemporary culture," State v. 
Alzaga, 2015 UT App 133, if 51, 352 P.3d 107. In Alzaga, for example, this Court 
affirmed the admission of the defendant's recorded statement in which he 
employed a variety of profanity, including using the £-word five times in just 
two sentences. Id. ~iJ44, 51. This Court held that these "words alone were 
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unlikely to induce the jury to return a conviction based on a generalized 
assessment of character." Id. 151 ( quotation and citation omitted). 
Defendant relies on State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 1989), to support 
his argument. But Maurer bears no resemblance to this case. 
There, the trial court admitted Maurer' s entire letter taunting his murder-
victim's father. See 770 P.2d at 982. Maurer's letter proclaimed his satisfaction 
in killing his victim-his ex-fiance-boasting that it was "a great feeling to 
watch her die," that she kept saying, "It hurts, it hurts," that he hoped so 
because he used II a 13-inch kitchen knife," and that her new boyfriend "got to 
watch her die too. It was great." Id. Maurer also denigrated his victim as 
"nothing but a fucking whore," who drifted "from one man to another." Id. He 
declared his hope that the victim's death 11hurt" her father, and Maurer 
concluded with, the "laugh[']s on you." Id. 
Defendant's voicemail clip bears no resemblance to Maurer's letter. As 
this Court observed in Alzaga, Maurer wrote his letter II to inflict additional 
emotional pain upon the victim's father." 2015 UT App 133. Defendant's 
voicemail lacked that characteristic and, at worst, evidenced only his frustration 
with his ex-wife. And whereas Maurer' s feelings towards his victim's father 
were irrelevant, Defendant's feelings toward Barbara were relevant to his state 
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of mind when he broke into her home. Defendant's reliance on Maurer is 
therefore misplaced. 
In sum, the 41-second voicemail clip was highly probative and contained 
little, if any, danger for unfair prejudice. The trial court therefore acted well 
within its discretion in admitting it. See Lucero, 2014 UT 15, if 35. 
III. 
DEFENDANT CANNOT SHOW THAT HIS COUNSEL WAS 
INEFFECTIVE FOR AGREEING TO THE TRIAL COURT'S 
AND BAILIFF'S INTERACTIONS WITH THE JURY 
Defendant argues that the trial judge and bailiff had improper contact 
with the jury. Br.Aplt. 33. Defendant first complains that, without counsel or 
Defendant present, the trial court explained to the jury why a recess had taken 
longer than expected. Br.Aplt. 33. He also complains that during jury 
deliberations, the court directed the bailiff to supervise the replaying of already 
admitted recordings. Br.Aplt. 33. Defendant argues that he preserved these 
arguments, but that if he did not, the trial court plainly erred or his counsel 
provided ineffective assistance. Br.Aplt. 39-41. Regardless of whether he 
preserved his arguments, Defendant asserts that he is entitled to a presumption 
of prejudice that the State cannot rebut on this record. Br.Aplt. 36-41. 
Defendant did not preserve either argument. In fact, he invited any error 
because his counsel agreed with the court's plans to explain the delay to the 
jury and to have the bailiff supervise replaying the recordings. Thus, the only 
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issue is whether counsel was ineffective for doing so. Defendant cannot show 
that his counsel was, because conceivable tactical reasons support counsel's 
decisions. And because Defendant did not preserve his arguments, he is not 
entitled to a presumption of prejudice. Rather, he must demonstrate prejudice, 
which he cannot do. 
A. Defendant invited any error because his counsel agreed to the 
interactions. 
1. Background. 
After the defense rested, the trial court announced a ten-minute recess. 
R348:49. The jury left the courtroom and counsel and the court discussed 
whether the prosecutor would introduce rebuttal evidence. R348:49-50. 
Defense counsel asked what witnesses the prosecutor would be calling. 
R348:50. When the prosecutor said that he was not sure, the court gave the 
prosecutor "10 or 15 minutes to decide." R348:50. 
When the court reconvened, still out of the jury's presence, the prosecutor 
said that he would not introduce any rebuttal evidence. R348:50-51. The 
parties then discussed several necessary modifications to the jury instructions 
and verdict forms. R348:51-55. 
As that discussion ended, the court told counsel that it intended to go to 
the jury room and explain why the recess had taken longer than planned. 
R348:55. The court specifically stated: 
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l.. 
Okay. We need time to do all those things. I'm going to tell the 
jury that we're working on all this, that there's no rebuttal. That 
we' re going to be copying jury instructions so it may take a few 
minutes more than 15 so they don't blame it on you. 
R348:55. Defense counsel responded, "Okay." R348:55 (Addendum D contains 
the discussion regarding the jury contacts). 
When the court and counsel reconvened, still out the jury's presence, the 
court made of record of what it had told the jury about the delay. R348:55-56. 
The court added that the jury had asked whether it would be able to listen to 
the recordings of Defendant's voicemail and Barbara's 911 call, which had been 
admitted into evidence. R348:55-56. The court stated: 
Ummm, we got the jury instructions copied. The-I went in and 
told the jury that it had been longer than a 15-break [sic] because 
we were copying all the jury instructions and putting in the ones 
that you had all brought this morning that I had given you the 
opportunity to bring and the State was deciding whether to do 
rebuttal and all that and they said, Well, when we get this case are 
we going to be able to listen to the tapes? Is there a transcript of 
the tapes? So I said there's no transcripts of the tapes, we will 
discuss whether you get to hear the tapes. 
R348:55-56. The court said that it was inclined to allow the jury to hear the 
recordings because "they are admitted into evidence." R348:56. The court 
suggested that both counsel could go into the jury room while the voicemail 
clip was played to ensure that the jury heard only the admitted portion. 
R348:56. 
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Defense counsel objected, but not to the court's contact with the jury. 
R348:56 (Add. D). Rather, he objected only to the jury hearing the recordings 
again because in his view, the recordings had not actually been admitted into 
evidence. R348:56. Counsel also objected to the court having both counsel go 
into the jury room during deliberations to replay the recordings. R348:56. The 
court decided that it would allow the jury to hear the recordings. R348:58. 
The court then instructed the jury, counsel made their closing arguments, 
and the jury retired for deliberations. R348:58-99. Apparently taking part of 
defense counsel's earlier objection to heart, the court suggested having "the 
prosecutor show the bailiff how to play those things, probably just the bailiff 
will go in." R348:99. Defense counsel did not object. R348:99-106. Rather, he 
asked only "to be present when [the prosecutor] gives the instructions to the 
bailiff." R348:100 (Add. D). 
2. Defendant invited any error. 
Defendant argues that his counsel preserved both of his appellate 
challenges because his counsel objected after the judge reported her off-the-
record contact with the jury and again objected II to the juror-bailiff contact." 
Br.Aplt. 39. But neither objection preserved the arguments that Defendant now 
raises on appeal, because counsel never objected to either jury contact; rather, 






Counsel did object after the court made a record of how it explained the 
delay to the jury, but counsel did not object to the court's doing so. R348:56. 
Rather, counsel objected only to the court's decision to replay the recordings for 
the jury and to allow both counsel to supervise that process. R348:56. Neither 
objection asserted that the court should not have explained the reasons for the 
delay to the jury. 
Defendant suggests that his counsel had no notice that the court would 
speak with the jury off-the-record. Br.Aplt. 33. He asserts that the judge did so 
"without notice to or in the presence of counsel." Br.Aplt. 33. Defendant 
misstates the record. 
Defense counsel not only knew of the court's plan to explain the delay to 
the jury off-the-record, but he actually agreed to that plan. When the court told 
counsel that it was "going to tell the jury that we're working on all this, that 
there's no rebuttal" and that "we' re going to be copying jury instructions so it 
may take a few minutes more than the 15," counsel responded, "Okay." 
R348:55. Counsel therefore endorsed the court's plan to explain the delay to the 
jury. 
Operating under the misconception that his counsel objected to the 
court's off-the-record contact with the jury, Defendant argues that any "further 
objection" would have been futile because the judge had already engaged in the 
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contact. Br.Aplt. 39. But if counsel believed that the interaction was improper, 
he could have preserved the issue by moving for a mish~ial, or for a new trial, 
after the contact happened. See State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 907 (Utah App. 1990) 
(mistrial motion after learning of jury contact preserved issue of improper jury 
contact); State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 279 (Utah 1985) (motion for new trial 
preserved issue of improper jury contact). Counsel did not do so. R348:55-106. 
Defendant therefore did not preserve his appellate challenge to the court-jury 
contact. See State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, if 17, 192 P.3d 867. 
Nor did Defendant preserve his appellate challenge to the bailiff-jury 
contact. Rather, defense counsel implicitly endorsed that contact. Br.Aplt. 39. 
Defense counsel objected after the court suggested that both counsel supervise 
replaying the recordings during deliberations. R348:56-58. But again, the bases 
for that objection were that (1) the jury should not be able to hear the recordings 
again; and (2) it would be improper to have counsel in the jury room. R348:56-
58. 
When the court suggested having the bailiff supervise the replaying, 
defense counsel did not object. R348:99-100. Rather, he implicitly endorsed that 
plan and asked to be present when the prosecutor instructed the bailiff on how 




Because his counsel endorsed both of the jury contacts that Defendant 
now complains of, Defendant invited any error. A party invites error when 
"counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the trial court 
that he or she had no objection to the proceedings." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, 
114, 128 P.3d 1171 (quotation and citation omitted). As explained, defense 
counsel endorsed both the trial court- and bailiff-jury interactions. Defendant 
therefore invited any error arising from those interactions. See id. 
B. The invited error doctrine precludes any plain error review. 
Defendant argues that if he did not preserve his arguments, this Court 
should nevertheless review them for plain error. Br.Aplt. 39-41. But "invited 
error precludes appellate review of an issue under the plain error standard." 
State v. Lee, 2014 UT App 4, ,r20, 318 P.3d 1164. Thus, this Court may review 
this issue only to determine whether Defendant's counsel was ineffective for 
not objecting to the jury contacts. 
C. Defendant cannot show that his counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to the jury interactions. 
Defendant argues in three sentences that his counsel was ineffective for 
not objecting to the jury contacts. Br.Aplt. 41. Defendant cannot satisfy either 
element of the ineffective assistance analysis. 
As explained, to prove that his counsel was ineffective, Defendant must 
prove both that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient 
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performance prejudiced him. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984). 
1. Defendant cannot show deficient performance because his 
counsel had sound tactical reasons for not objecting. 
Defendant cannot show deficient performance because conceivable 
tactical bases explain why he would agree to allowing the judge to explain the 
delay to the jury and to having the bailiff supervise replaying the recordings. 
This Court's review of counsel's performance begins with "a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance." State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997) ( quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). This presumption exists because of the "variety of 
circumstances faced by defense counsel" and "the range of legitimate decisions 
regarding how to best represent a criminal defendant." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 
1250, 1254 (Utah 1993); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The presumption 
recognizes that, "[u]nlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the 
relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with 
the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge." Harrington v. Richter, 
131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011). 
To rebut the strong presumption of reasonable performance, Defendant 
must "persuad[e] the court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for 
counsel's actions." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,r 6, 89 P.3d 162 ( emphasis in 
-38-
original) (quotations and citation omitted); Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, if19, 
165 P.3d 1195 (holding that the "defendant" must "overcome the presumption" 
of competent representation"). "If a rational basis for counsel's performance 
can be articulated, [this Court] will assume counsel acted competently." State v. 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993). Thus, any conceivable tactical 
basis for trial counsel's actions defeats a claim of deficient performance. See 
Clark, 2004 UT 25, if 7, 89 P.3d 162; State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, 158, 61 
P.3d 291. 
Conceivable tactical bases explain counsel's decision not to object. First, 
counsel could have reasonably concluded that allowing the court to explain the 
reasons for the delay to the jury would reduce the likelihood that the jury 
would become irritated or frustrated with the proceedings, or even with 
counsel, especially immediately before closing argument. Second, counsel 
could have reasonably concluded that having the bailiff supervise replaying the 
recordings would eliminate the risk that the jury would hear portions of 
Defendant's voicemail that counsel had successfully argued to keep the jury 
from hearing. 
Counsel could have also reasonably concluded that both the court's and 
the bailiff's interactions with the jury were innocuous. A judge's brief 
communication with the jury to address scheduling matters is not presumed to 
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be prejudicial. State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, if if 68-70, 299 P.3d 892. Indeed, 
"'[t]here is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have 
occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a 
matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial."' Id. if 69 (quoting 
Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 115 (1983)). 
Defendant argues that the "judge's off-the-record conversation with the 
jury involved 'substantive matters,' not mere trial logistics." Br.Aplt. 36 
(quoting Maestas, 2012 UT 46, if70). Defendant asserts that the judge discussed 
with the jury whether the prosecution would introduce rebuttal evidence. 
Br.Aplt. 36. He further argues that the judge's use of the phrase, "'and all 
that,"' shows that she engaged the jury in "a detailed off-the-record 
conversation about matters directly related to trial." Br.Aplt. 36. 
The record does not support Defendant's reading. Rather, it shows that 
the court merely reported the reasons that the recess was taking longer than 
announced, which included finalizing the jury instructions and the prosecutor's 
decision about rebuttal. R348:55-56. When the jury raised a substantive 
matter- whether they would receive transcripts of Defendant's voicemail and 
Barbara's 911 call, or whether they could hear those recordings again-the court 
expressly declined to answer that question without first consulting counsel. 
R348:56. 
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Defendant's speculation about what the judge meant by the phrase "and 
all that" does not establish that the judge discussed substantive matters with the 
jury. The most reasonable interpretation of the judge's colloquialism is that she 
was merely referring to the various factors she had already mentioned as 
contributing to the delay. 
Defendant argues that the discussion might have created a sense of 
familiarity with the judge. Br.Aplt. 36. But as Maestas recognized, the jury 
would not have considered it unusual for the judge to explain scheduling 
matters. See 2012 UT 46, ifif 69-71. Indeed, "it seems unlikely that jurors would 
feel any differently toward the judge than if" she had explained the reasons for 
the delay "with counsel and [Defendant] present." Id. if71. And because "the 
judge was not an adversary ... it would not have been problematic if jurors felt 
appreciative toward the judge after" she explained the reasons for the delay. Id. 
For all these reasons, counsel could have reasonably concluded that there was 
nothing improper about the court's interaction with the jury, and therefore no 
reason to object. 
Defendant argues that the bailiff's contact was improper because he "was 
present while the jury actually deliberated." Br.Aplt. 38. To support this 
proposition, Defendant cites United States v. Pratt, 351 F.3d 131, 138-39 (4th Cir. 
2003), where the Fourth Circuit held that no error occurred when a bailiff "cued 
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up the audiotape to the designated spot" and then left. Br.Aplt. 38. The Fourth 
Circuit distinguished that circumstance from the one in United States v. Freeman, 
634 F.2d 1267, 1268 (10th Cir. 1980), where the Tenth Circuit held that reversible 
error occurred after a "technician" played a tape to a jury during deliberations, 
because "the technician [was] present during actual deliberations." Pratt, 351 
F.3d at 139. But the Tenth Circuit held that the Freeman procedure was 
prejudicial because the "technician" who played the recording during 
deliberations was an FBI agent who was "the chief government investigator in 
the case" and who had testified for the government during the trial. 634 F.2d at 
1268-69. 
That did not happen here. The bailiff was not a witness, nor was he 
associated with either party. Thus, the events here more closely resemble the 
innocuous bailiff-juror contact in State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 907-10 (Utah App. 
1990). 
In Jonas, a juror was excused mid-trial because of a family emergency and 
asked the bailiff to explain his absence to the other jurors, which the bailiff did 
off the record. Id. at 907-08. This Court held that this bailiff-jury contact was 
innocuous because there was no discussion between the bailiff and the jury 
about the dismissed juror, the bailiff had not been a witness, he did not 
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,-ii) 
interrupt the jury's deliberations, and the bailiff's report concerned something 
tangential to the trial. Id. at 909-10. 
While the bailiff's contact here did occur during deliberations, that fact 
alone does not make the contact prejudicial. There is no evidence that the bailiff 
did anything other than replay the already admitted portions of the recordings 
to the jury. There is no evidence that any deliberating happened while the 
bailiff did so. And the bailiff's presence was necessary to ensure that the jury 
heard only the portion of the Defendant's voicemail that had been admitted. 
Thus the jury would have viewed the bailiff's presence during deliberations as 
routine and necessary. Bailiff-jury contact is "expected and unavoidable since 
the bailiff is assigned to minister to the jurors' needs and to be the contact 
person." Jonas, 793 P .2d at 909. 
Because these reasons establish conceivable tactical bases for not 
objecting to the jury contacts, Defendant has not rebutted the presumption that 
his counsel's performance was objectively reasonable. 
2. Defendant cannot show prejudice because the contacts were 
innocuous. 
Nor can Defendant show prejudice. Defendant argues that he is entitled 
to a presumption of prejudice that the State must rebut. Br.Aplt. 40-41. Utah 
courts do take "a strict approach" to claims of improper juror contact. State v. 
Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1985). Under this approach, "a rebuttable 
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presumption of prejudice arises from any unauthorized contact during a trial 
between witnesses, attorneys or court personnel and jurors which goes beyond 
a mere incidental, unintended, and brief contact." Id. 
But this presumption applies only to preserved claims. See Maestas, 2012 
UT 46, ,r,rs9, 67-71. In Maestas, for example, the defendant did not preserve his 
claims of improper juror contact. Id. ,r,r70-71. The Utah Supreme Court 
therefore refused to apply a presumption of prejudice and instead required 
Maestas to show that any error was harmful. Id. if 71 ("Without a presumption 
of prejudice, Mr. Maestas must show harm in order to prevail on his claim."). 
Moreover, because this Court must review this issue under an ineffective 
assistance of counsel analysis, Defendant bears the burden of proving prejudice 
as a necessary element of his claim. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-87. A 
defendant cannot prove that his counsel was ineffective unless he carries the 
burden to prove that his counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial. State 
v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, if 46, 796 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-
87). And while prejudice may be presumed for certain ineffective assistance 
claims, "this class of error is extremely limited, including, for example, an actual 
or constructive denial of the right to counsel or when counsel labors under an 
actual conflict of interest." Id. if 46 n.18 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692). 
Defendant's claim does not involve those kinds of presumptively prejudicial 
-44-
circumstances. He must therefore prove prejudice. Id. if 46; Maestas, 2012 UT 
46, if71. 
Defendant cannot do so for the reasons already explained. The trial 
court's brief contact with the jury involved only scheduling- not substantive-
issues. The jury would not have seen such interaction as unusual, nor would 
the interaction have had the potential to improperly influence the jury. 
Additionally, Instruction 15 told the jury that the judge was "neutral," that if 
the jury believed that something the judge did indicated favoritism for one side 
or the other "that was not [the judge's] intention," and that jurors should "not 
interpret anything" the judge said or did as indicating that the judge had "any 
particular view of the evidence or the decision you should reach." R263. All of 
these factors mitigated any potential for prejudice arising from the judge's 
contact with the jury. 
Likewise, the jury would not have viewed the bailiff's replaying of 
already admitted recordings as unusual, nor would they have been improperly 
influenced thereby. There is no record that the bailiff did anything but replay 
the recordings for the jury. For all these reasons, Defendant cannot prove 
prejudice. He therefore cannot establish either element of his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. 
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IV. 
AFTER DEFENSE COUNSEL REFERRED TO THE VICTIM'S 
WRITTEN POLICE STATEMENT DURING CROSS-
EXAMINATION, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED 
THE ENTIRE STATEMENT UNDER RULE 106, UTAH RULES 
OF EVIDENCE 
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously admitted Barbara's one-
paragraph written witness statement under the rule of completeness found in 
rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence, and as a prior consistent statement under rule 
801(d)(l)(B), Utah Rules of Evidence. Br.Aplt. 41-47. Defendant argues that the 
entire statement was inadmissible under rule 106 because that rule admits only 
those portions of a statement that are '"necessary to rebut the charges of recent 
fabrication."' Br.Aplt. 45 (quoting State v. Bujan, 2008 UT 47, ,r10, 190 P.3d 
1255). Relying on Bujan, Defendant argues that Barbara's written statement was 
inadmissible as a prior consistent statement because it was made after she had a 
motive to fabricate. Br.Aplt. 42-43. 
The trial court properly admitted the statement under rule 106. After 
defense counsel repeatedly referred to portions of the statement in cross-
examining Barbara, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to find that 
fairness required the jury to see the entire statement. Regardless, any error was 
harmless where Barbara had already testified to most of the details in her 
statement, Defendant's testimony corroborated most of Barbara's testimony, 
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and Defendant's assertion that Barbara fabricated the uncorroborated details 
was weak. 
Defendant did not preserve his Bujan argument. He argues that his 
counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the statement, and that the trial 
court plainly erred for not sua sponte excluding it, on that basis. But Defendant 
cannot prove the prejudice element of either theory because the statement was 
independently admissible under rule 106 or, at best, any error in admitting the 
statement under that rule was harmless. 
A. Background. 
The trial court admits, but then withdraws the written police statement 
During Barbara's direct examination, the prosecutor moved to admit her 
written witness statement. R347:97 (Addendum E is the discussion on 
admitting the witness statement). Defense counsel objected that the statement 
was hearsay. R347:97-98. The trial court initially overruled the objection and 
admitted the written statement under rule 801(d)(l)(B). R347:98-102. That rule 
allows admission of a witness's prior consistent statement that "is offered to 
rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or 
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acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying." 6 Utah R. 
Evid. 801(d)(l)(B). 
The trial court allowed the exhibit to be published to the jury. 
R347:102,107-08. But the jury did not have the exhibit for long because the trial 
court quickly reversed its ruling. R347:106-08,111 (Add. E). 
After a recess, the trial court reversed itself because it realized that it had 
misread rule 801 as placing no restrictions on admitting a prior consistent 
statement. R347:106-08. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, but the trial 
court denied the motion because it did not believe that the jury's having had the 
exhibit "for two minutes" required such a drastic remedy. R347:106-07. The 
court then explained to the jury that after having re-read the hearsay rule, 
defense counsel was "correct" that the written statement was "not admissible 
under Rule 801" and that the court "was wrong" to have admitted it. R347:111. 
The court explained that it was retracting the exhibit from the jury. R347:111 
(Add. E). 
6 The transcript has the prosecutor arguing that Barbara's witness 
statement was admissible as a prior "inconsistent" statement. R347:98. Later 
discussion clarifies, however, that the prosecutor was arguing that the 
statement was admissible as a prior "consistent" statement and that the trial 
court initially admitted the statement on this ground. R347:100-02,105-06. 
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Defense counsel repeatedly refers to portions of 
the withdrawn exhibit during cross-examination 
While cross-examining Barbara, defense counsel repeatedly asked her 
about her police statement. R347:122-23. He first asked her to confirm that she 
did not write that Defendant had grabbed her. R347:122-23. When Barbara 
replied that she could not remember exactly what she wrote, counsel showed 
her a copy of the statement and asked "isn't it true that the word grab, 
grabbing, grabbed, none of those words appear in that statement?" R347:123. 
Barbara agreed. R347:123. Counsel then emphasized that the detective had 
instructed Barbara to "write down what happened" and "tell him everything." 
R347:123. 
Counsel then asked whether Barbara had written that Defendant had 
feinted punches at her face. R347:128-29. Barbara admitted that she did not. 
R347:129. Counsel again emphasized that the police had asked Barbara "to tell 
them the full details of the incident." R347:129. 
Counsel then reiterated that although Barbara had testified at the 
preliminary hearing that Defendant had grabbed her wrist, she did not include 
that detail in her police statement. R347:131. Counsel emphasized that "the 
word wrist doesn't even appear" in the statement. R347:132. 
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On redirect, Barbara explained that she did not mention the feinted 
punches because she "didn't really think about it or remember it until later." 
R347:143. 
The trial court readmits the written witness statement 
Barbara's testimony concluded and the trial court excused the jury. 
R347:145. The trial court ruled that counsel's cross-examination had opened the 
door to admitting Barbara's written witness statement because counsel had 
"implied" that she had "fabricated at some point." R347:147 (Add. E). The 
court thus admitted Barbara's entire police statement as a prior consistent 
statement under rule 801(d){l)(B). R347:151. 
Defense counsel objected to admitting the entire statement and argued 
that only those portions that were consistent with challenged portions of 
Barbara's testimony were admissible. R347:148-54. Counsel conceded that two 
of Barbara's written statements were admissible: (1) that she "was still trying to 
get [her] phone back to call 911"; and (2) that Defendant "said he should just 
push [her] down the stairs." R347:153. 
The prosecutor responded that the rule of completeness allowed 
admission of the entire statement. R347:154. Defense counsel disagreed, 
arguing that the rule of completeness did not override the hearsay rule. 
R347:154. 
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The trial court ultimately overruled defense counsel's objections and 
admitted Barbara's one-paragraph statement as State's Exhibit 4. R347:155 
(Addendum F is a copy of the statement). The court explained that defense 
counsel had "referred too much to the statement" and could not "keep pulling 
bits and piece[s] of it out and expect that it's not going to go into evidence." 
R347:155,160. The court was also concerned that counsel's cross-examination 
had taken "a bunch of stuff out of context." R347:149. The court reasoned that 
because counsel had "thrown into question things that [Barbara] did not 
include in here ... it only seems fair" to admit the entire statement II to show the 
things that she did include." R347:160 (Add. E). 
The prosecutor then recalled Barbara and reoffered her witness statement 
as an exhibit, which the trial court received. R347:162-63;SE#4. That statement 
reads: 
My ex[-]husband came to my home drunk[.] I did not want to 
answer the door. He started kicking the back door. I grab[b]ed my 
phone and was yelling at him to leave[.] He broke the door in[.] I 
called 911 and [h]e took my phone and would not give it back[.] 
He was still yelling at me telling me I owe him money and I will 
not get it back. We got to the front door and I was still trying to get 
my phone back to call 911[.] He pushed me and said [h]e should 
just push me down the stairs. He got in his truck and I ran to [the] 
neighbor[']s [h]ouse[.] 
SE #4 (Add. F). 
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B. The witness statement was admissible under rule 106. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously admitted Barbara's 
entire witness statement under rule 106, because that rule allows admission of 
only "'information necessary to rebut the charges of recent fabrication."' 
Br.Aplt. 45 ( quoting Bujan, 2008 UT 47, 110). Defendant argues that although 
he impeached Barbara's testimony by showing that her witness statement 
omitted any mention of him grabbing or feinting punches at her, the statement 
was nevertheless inadmissible under rule 106 because it "was not relevant to 
rehabilitating Barbara's testimony regarding these claimed inconsistencies." 
Br.Aplt. 45. On the contrary, Barbara's entire statement was relevant to dispel 
Defendant's notion that she could not accurately report the event and was 
embellishing her trial testimony. 
Known as the rule of completeness, rule 106 "permits introduction of an 
otherwise inadmissible statement if the opposing party introduces a portion of 
the statement." State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, if 40,345 P.3d 1195. The rule provides 
that when "a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an 
adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part-or 
any other writing or recorded statement-that in fairness ought to be 
considered at the same time." Utah R. Evid. 106. The rule is designed "to 




(quoting State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, if44 n.6, 993 P.2d 232). "The rule 
establishes a 'fairness' standard that requires 'admission of those things that are 
relevant and necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the portion 
already introduced."' Id. (quoting State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, 114, 76 P.3d 
1165). 
Fairness required admission of Barbara's entire witness statement. While 
cross-examining Barbara, counsel repeatedly highlighted that while she had 
testified that Defendant had grabbed her and feinted punches, she omitted 
those details from her written statement, even though she had been instructed 
to explain "everything that happened." R347:122-23,128-29,131-32. That line of 
questioning suggested that Barbara's entire testimony was unreliable because 
she could not accurately report the events. It further suggested that she was 
embellishing her testimony with events that did not happen because her 
witness statement alone did not fully support Defendant's charges. 
To rebut these suggestions, the jury needed to see exactly how Barbara 
had described the events in her written statement. Only by reviewing the entire 
statement could the jury understand what details of her trial testimony she had 
included in her written statement. Comparing Barbara's entire statement with 
her testimony thus allowed the jury to fairly assess Barbara's ability to 
accurately report the events. Reviewing the entire statement also allowed the 
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jury to see that the statement alone contained sufficient detail to support the 
charges. This allowed the jury to accurately assess whether the omissions in 
Barbara's written statement resulted from her desire to fabricate details 
necessary to support the charges, or whether the omissions had an innocent 
explanation. Given counsel's cross-examination, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that fairness required the jury to see Barbara's entire 
written statement. 
This Court reached a similar result in State v. MontgomenJ, 2007 UT App 
24U, if 4. There, during cross-examination, the defendant's counsel questioned a 
detective about a paragraph of his police report. Id. On redirect, the State had 
the detective read the first and second paragraphs of his report "to clarify 
questions addressed in the cross-examination." Id. This Court held that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting those portions of the police 
report under rule 106, because the defendant "introduced the police report and 
the State merely used the report to clarify issues raised by" the defendant. Id. 
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has likewise explained that 
under the rule of completeness: "Counsel cannot be permitted, for the purpose 
of impeaching a witness, to introduce extracts of the former testimony of such 
witness, and then be heard to complain that the whole of such testimony was 
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introduced, and the whole truth given to the jury." Goode v. State, 236 P.3d 671, 
678 (Okla. Crim. App. 2010) ( quotation and citation omitted). 
Defendant argues in a footnote that rule 106 cannot apply here because 
he did not introduce any portion of Barbara's written statement, but rather 
referred only to omissions from her statement. Br.Aplt. 46 n.13. But that logic 
would frustrate the fairness concerns that rule 106 protects. For that reason, the 
South Carolina Court of Appeals rejected a similar argument in State v. 
Patterson, 625 S.E.2d 239, 227-28 (S.C. App. 2006). The Patterson court refused to 
construe "Rule 106 in such a way that inquiries that probed at alleged omissions 
from a statement would not open the door to the admission of the statement" 
because that would frustrate the rule's purpose. Id. at 228. The Patterson court 
therefore held that" the rule of completeness applies to insinuations, innuendos, 
and omissions." Id. 
That reasoning equally applies here. As this Court recognized in Leleae, a 
11 trial court has considerable discretion in determining issues of fairness." 1999 
UT App 368, if 45. Here, after defense counsel repeatedly highlighted omissions 
in Barbara's statement, fairness required that the jury see Barbara's entire 
statement to II qualify, explain, or place into context" those omissions. See id. 
(quotation and citation omitted). The trial court therefore acted well within its 
discretion in admitting the entire statement under rule 106. See id. if 46. 
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C. Any error was harmless because almost all of the statement's 
details were already before the jury, Defendant's testimony 
corroborated most of those details, and his argument that the 
victim fabricated the uncorroborated details was weak. 
In any event, any error in admitting Barbara's one-paragraph witness 
statement was harmless because the jury had already heard almost all of the 
details in the statement and Defendant's testimony corroborated most of those 
details. When erroneously admitted evidence is cumulative or corroborated by 
the defendant's own statements, the error is harmless. See State v. Bundy, 684 
P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1984); see also State v. McClellan, 2009 UT 50, ,I32, 216 P.3d 956 
(any error in admitting defendant's recorded police interrogation was harmless 
because "[i]dentical evidence was already before the jury in the form of the 
testimony of the interviewing officer"). 
Here, Barbara had already testified to almost all of the details in her 
written statement. And Defendant corroborated many of those details when he 
testified that he kicked in Barbara's back door, entered her home, took her 
phone, and fled. R348:23-25. 
The only portion of her statement that Barbara did not testify to was her 
statement that Defendant "was still yelling at me telling me I owe him money 
and I will not get it back." SE #4 (Add. F). Defendant argues that this 
statement was prejudicial because the jury "might have relied" on it to find that 
Defendant entered or remained in Barbara's home with the intent to 
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permanently deprive her of her cellphone. Br.Aplt. 47. But it is not clear that 
Barbara was reporting that Defendant said she would not get her phone back. 
Rather, the more logical reading of her statement is that Defendant was saying 
that Barbara would not get her money back. The relevant portion of the 
statement reads: 
I called 911 and [h]e took my phone and would not give it back[.] 
He was still yelling at me telling me I owe him money and I will 
not get it back. 
SE #4 (Add. F). In context, the "it" that Barbara refers to is the "money" that 
she mentioned in the same sentence, not the "phone" that she mentioned in the 
previous sentence. 
But even if Defendant's reading is plausible, he still cannot show 
prejudice because he cannot show a reasonable probability that the jury would 
have read the statement that same way. To show prejudicial error, Defendant 
"must demonstrate that absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome." State v. Perea, 213 UT 68, if 97,322 P.3d 624 (quotation 
and citation omitted). Because the statement is ambiguous at best, there is no 
reasonable probability that the jury seized on it as evidence of Defendant's 
intent to commit theft, especially where the prosecutor did not refer to it in his 
closing arguments. R348:80-86,95-98. 
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Additionally, Defendant's basis for insinuating that Barbara fabricated 
this detail was weak. As the trial court recognized, the outcome of this case 
could not affect whether Barbara owed Defendant money. R347:130-31. There 
was no evidence that Barbara would be relieved of her debt if Defendant were 
convicted of a felony. Additionally, Defendant's own testimony demonstrated 
that Barbara did not fabricate the event because he corroborated much of her 
account. The only portions of Barbara's statement that Defendant did not 
corroborate were her statements: (1) that he yelled at her that she owed him 
money and she would not get it back; and (2) that he pushed her and 
threatened to push her down the stairs. But Defendant does not offer a viable 
reason that Barbara would have fabricated these statements in the short time 
between calling police and writing her statement that same day. 
Defendant argues that admitting the statement was harmful because the 
court "emphasized" it by admitting it, withdrawing it, and then readmitting it. 
Br.Aplt. 47-48. On the contrary, if the court's actions suggested anything about 
the statement, it was only that an exhibit that the court had improperly 
admitted was now admissible because defense counsel had referred to it while 
cross-examining Barbara. 
Finally, Defendant argues that admitting the witness statement was 




acquitted him of making a threat of violence. Br.Aplt. 21, 47. But the jury's split 
verdict does not demonstrate that it necessarily believed Defendant. The "most 
that can be said in such cases is that the verdict shows that either in the 
acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that 
does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt." Dunn v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932) (quotation and citation omitted); see also 
United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1984). 
"[I]nconsistent verdicts- even verdicts that acquit on a predicate offense 
while convicting on the compound offense-should not necessarily be 
interpreted as a windfall to the Government at the defendant's expense. It is 
equally possible that the jury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its 
conclusion on the compound offense, and then through mistake, compromise, 
or lenity, arrived at an inconsistent conclusion on the lesser offense." Powell, 
469 U.S. 64-65. 
There were several reasons that the jury might acquit Defendant of 
making a threat of violence even without believing his story. Barbara gave 
inconsistent reports about Defendant's threats. As explained, Barbara did not 
include the details about Defendant's threats in her written witness statement, 
nor did Barbara tell the 911 operator that Defendant had feinted punches 
towards her face. R347:131;SE#4. And although Barbara testified that 
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Defendant did not try to throw her down the stairs, she told the 911 operator 
that Defendant did try to push her down the stairs. R347:127-28. Barbara also 
told the 911 operator that she did not want to get Defendant in trouble. 
R347:167;SE#6 at 3:11-3:14. Given these inconsistencies, the jury could have 
disbelieved Defendant but still found that the prosecution had not proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he threatened her with violence. Thus, the split 
verdict does not demonstrate that the jury necessarily believed Defendant. 
In sum, Barbara had already testified to almost all of the details in her 
witness statement, Defendant corroborated most of those details, and the jury's 
verdict does not demonstrate that they necessarily believed Defendant. 
Defendant therefore cannot show that any error in admitting the written 
statement was harmful. See Perea, 213 UT 68, if 97. 
D. Defendant did not preserve his argument that the witness 
statement was inadmissible under Bujan and cannot show that 
the trial court plainly erred or that his counsel was ineffective. 
Defendant did not preserve his argument that Barbara's police statement 
was inadmissible under Bujan because he did not make that argument below. 
See State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, if17, 192 P.3d 867. Rather, counsel conceded that 
two parts of Barbara's witness statement were admissible as prior consistent 
statements under rule 801(d)(l)(b), even though they were allegedly made after 




If anything, this concession signaled that counsel was not concerned about the 
timing of the police statement. Rather, defense counsel's only objection was 
that, other than those two statements that were consistent with her trial 
testimony, the rest of Barbara's police statement was hearsay and therefore 
inadmissible, even under the rule of completeness. R347:97-98,148-54. Because 
that was the only basis for Defendant's objection, that was the only argument 
that he preserved. See Low, 2008 UT 58, if 17. 
Defendant briefs his Bujan challenge as if preserved, but argues in the 
closing paragraphs that if he did not preserve the argument, then the trial court 
plainly erred and his counsel was ineffective for not raising it. Br.Aplt. 49. As 
explained, plain error requires a showing of obvious, prejudicial error. See State 
v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, if 28, 354 P.3d 791. To show that his counsel was 
ineffective, Defendant must prove both that his counsel's performance was 
deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him. See Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687. The plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel standards 
"share a common standard of prejudice." State v. McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, 
if 42,302 P.3d 844. 
Defendant cannot show either plain error or ineffective assistance 
because he cannot establish the prejudice element of either theory. Even if 
Barbara's statement were inadmissible under rule 801(D)(l)(B), it was 
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independently admissible under rule 106 or, at most, any error in admitting it 
under that rule was harmless. Therefore, Defendant cannot show that the trail 
court plainly erred for not sua sponte excluding Barbara's written statement 
under Bujan, or that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the 
statement on that basis, because he cannot show that any error in admitting the 
statement was prejudicial. 
V. 
THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE 
Finally, Defendant argues that he is entitled to relief under the 
cumulative error doctrine. Br.Aplt. 50. This Court "will reverse a jury verdict 
under the cumulative error doctrine only 'if the cumulative effect of the several 
errors undermines ... confidence that a fair trial was had."' State v. Killpack, 
2008 UT 49, ,r 58, 191 P.3d 17 (quoting State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ,r 73, 28 P.3d 
1278 (omissions in original)). As demonstrated, Defendant has not shown any 
error, or at most, only one harmless error. His cumulative error claim therefore 
fails. See id. (rejecting a cumulative error claim where the defendant failed to 
demonstrate any error). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Statutes and Rules 
Addendu1n A 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2015). Burglary. 
@ (1) An actor is guilty of burglary who enters or remains unlawfully in a building 
/~ 
or any portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
(b) theft; 
(c) an assault on any person; 
(d) lewdness, a violation of Section 76-9-702; 
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Section 76-9-702.1; 
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or 
(g) voyeurism under Section 76-9-702. 7. 
(2) Burglary is a third degree felony unless it was committed in a dwelling, in 
which event it is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses listed 
in Subsections (1)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the actor 
while in the building. 
Amended by Chapter 303, 2012 General Session 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-401 (West 2015). Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible and 
intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds, written 
insb4 uments or other writings representing or embodying rights concerning real 
or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise containing anything of value 
to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature such as telecommunications, 
gas, elechAicity, steam, or water, and trade secrets, meaning the whole or any 
portion of any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, 
formula or invention which the owner thereof intends to be available only to 
persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of 
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property, whether to 
the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to secure performance 
thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any facsimile, replica, 
photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or to use 
under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its economic value, or 
of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it unlikely that 
the owner will recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not necessarily 
limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law larceny by 
LTespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, and embezzlement. 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or fact that 
is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to affect 
the judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor previously 
created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment 
of another and that the actor does not now believe to be true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his judgment 
in the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without disclosing a 
lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the 
enjoyment of the property, whether the lien, security interest, claim, or 
impediment is or is not valid or is or is not a matter of official record; or 
(e) Pro1nises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the 
transaction, which performance the actor does not intend to perform or 
knows will not be performed; provided, however, that failure to perform the 
promise in issue without other evidence of intent or knowledge is not 
sufficient proof tl1at the actor did not intend to perform or knew the prornise 
would not be performed. 
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (West 2015). Theft-Elements. 
A person com1nits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized conh·ol over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session 
Utah R. Evid. 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded Statements 
;.i) If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse 
party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part - or any other 
writing or recorded statement - that in fairness ought to be considered at the 
same time. 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as 
part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood 
and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These 
changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result 
~ in any ruling on evidence admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) was not as 
specific, but Rule 106 is otherwise in accord with Utah practice. 
Utah R. Evid. 403. Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, 
Waste of Time, or Other Reasons 
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as 
part of tbe restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them 1nore easily understood 
and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These 
changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result 
in any ruling on evidence admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule 
45, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) except that" surprise" is not included as a basis 
for exclusion of relevant evidence. The change in language is not one of 
substance, since "surprise" would be within the concept of "unfair prejudice" as 
contained in Rule 403. See also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 
indicating that a continuance in most instances would be a more appropriate 
method of dealing with "surprise." See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. 
Tex. 1977)(surprise use of psychiatric testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial 
and violation of due process). See the following Utah cases to the same effect. 
Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); State 1.J. Johns, 615 
P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980); Reiser v. Lo/mer, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982). 
Utah R. Evid. 801. Definitions That Apply to This Article; Exclusions from 
Hearsay 
(a) Sta tern en t. "Statement" means a person's oral assertion, written assertion, 
or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion. 
(b) Oeclarant. "Declarant" means the person who made the state1nent. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" means a statement that: 
(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or 
hearing; and 
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in 
the statement. 
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the following 
conditions is not hearsay: 
(1) A Declarant-Witness's Prior Statement. The declarant testifies and is 
subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement: 
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the declarant 
denies having made the statem.ent or has forgotten, or 
(B) is consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut 
an express or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or 
acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying; or 
(C) identifies a person as someone the d~clarant perceived earlier. 
(2) An Opposing Party's Statement. The statement is offered against an 
opposing party and: 
(A) was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity; 
(B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true; 
(C) was made by a person whom the party authorized to make a 
statement on the subject; 
(D) was made by the party's agent or employee on a matter within the 
scope of that relationship and while it existed; or 
(E) was made by the party's coconspirator during and in furtherance of 
the conspiracy. 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as 
part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood 
and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These 
changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result 
in any ruling on evidence admissibility. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Subsection (a) is in accord with Rule 62(1), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subsection (b) is in accord with Rule 62(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The 
hearsay rule is not applicable in declarations of devices and 1nachines, e.g., radar. 
The definition of "hearsay" in subdivision (c) is substantially the same as Rule 
63, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (d)(1) is similar to Rule 63(1), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). It 
deviates from the federal rule in that it allows use of prior statements as 
substantive evidence if (1) inconsistent or (2) the wih1ess has forgotten, and does 
not require the prior state1nent to have been given under oath or subject to 
perjury. The former Utah rules admitted such statements as an exception to the 
hearsay rule. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), with respect to 
confrontation problems under the Sixth Amend1nent to the United States 
Constitution. Subdivision (d)(l) is as originally promulgated by the United States 
Supreme Court with the addition of the language "or the witness denies having 
made the statement or has forgotten" and is in keeping with the prior Utah rule 
and the actual effect on most juries. 
Subdivision (d)(1)(B) is in substance the same as Rule 63(1), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971). The Utah court has been liberal in its interpretation of the 
applicable rule in this general area. State v. Slbert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388 
(1957). 
Subdivision (d)(1)(C) comports with prior Utah case law. State v. Owens, 15 Utah 
2d 123, 388 P.2d 797 (1964); State v. Vasquez, 22 Utah 2d 277, 451 P.2d 786 (1969). 
The substance of subdivision (d)(2)(A) was contained in Rules 63(6) and (7), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971 ), as an exception to the hearsay rule. 
Similar provisions to subdivisions (d)(2)(B) and (C) were contained in Rule 63(8), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), as an exception to the hearsay rule. 
Rule 63(9), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), was of similar substance and scope to 
subdivision (d)(2)(D), except that Rule 63(9) required that the declarant be 
unavailable before such admissions are received. Adoptive and vicarious 
admissions have been recognized as admissible in criminal as well as civil cases. 
Stnte v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980). 
Statements by a coconspira tor of a party made during the course and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy, admissible as non-hearsay under subdivision 
( d)(2)(E), have h·aditionally been ad1nitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule. State 
v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941). Rule 63(9)(b), Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971), was broader than this rule in that it provided for the admission of 
state1nents made while the party and declarant were participating in a plan to 
com1nit a crime or a civil wrong if the statement was relevant to the plan or its 
subject matter and made while the plan was in existence and before its complete 
execution or other termination. 
ADDENDUM B 
Relevant Jury Instructions (R272-81) 
Addendum B 
-
INSTRUCTION NO. 2Y 
OFFENSE REQUIRES CONDUCT AND MENTAL ST A TE: 
A person cannot be found guilty of a criminal offense unless that person's 
conduct is-prohibited by law, AND at the time the conduct occurred, the defendant 
demonstrated a particular mental state specified by law. 
"Conduct" can mean both an "act" or a failure to act when the law requires a 
person to act. An "act" is a voluntary movement of the body and it can include 
speech. 
As to the "mental state" requirement, the prosecution must prove that at the 
time the defendant acted (or failed to act), he/she did so with a particuiar mental 
state. For each offense, the law defines what kind of mental state the defendant 
had to have, if any. For some crimes the defendant.must have acted 'interitio1:1-ally" 
or "knowingly". For other crimes it is enough that the defendant acted 
"recklessly11 , "with criminal negligence" or with some other specified mental state. 
Later, I will instruct you on the specific conduct and mental state that the 
prosecution must prove before the defendant can be found guilty of the crime(s) 
charged. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
INTENTIONAL, KNOWING AND RECKLESS MENTAL ST ATES: 
As I stated in another instruction, the prosecution must prove that at the time 
the defendant acted, he/she did so with a particular mental state. For each offense, 
the law defines what kind of mental state the defendant had to have, if any. 
For the crime(s) charged in this case, the defendant must have acted 
'intentionally" or "knowingly" or recklessly. The prosecution must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly or 
recklessly before the defendant can be found guilty of the crime charged. 
A person engages in conduct intentionally or with intent or willfully with 
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his 
conscious objective or desire to engage in the ~onduct or cause the result. 
,, 
A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with knowledge, with resp·ect to 
his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the 
nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or 
with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
A person engages in conduct recklessiy with respeci to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
? ,.1 9 
-· 4 tr 
INSTR_UCTION NO. 2h 
INFERRING THE REQUIRED MENTAL STA TE: 
The law requires that the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant acted with a particular mental state. 
Ordinarily, there is no way that a defendant's mental state can be proven 
directly, because no one can tell what another person is thinking. 
A defendant's mental state can be proved indirectly from the surrounding 
facts and circumstances. This includes things like what the defendant said, what 
the defendant did, and any other evidence that shows what was in the defendant's 
m;nrl 
.I.L.l.&&.1.U• 
~!. 7 4 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 27 
MOTIVE: 
A defendant's mental state is not the same as "motive". Motive is why a 
person does something. Motive is not an element of the crime(s) charged in this 
case. As a result, the pr-osecutor does not have to prove why the defendant acted 
(or failed to act). 
However, motive or lack of motive may help you determine if the defendant 
did what he/she is charged with doing. It may also help you determine what 
his/her mental state was at the time. 
?. 7 ,.., 
,~! a 
INSTRUCTION NO. J..2' 
The defendant, KEN JOHNSON, is charged in Count I, with Burglary (Domestic 
Violence), on or about March 30, 2014. You cannot convict of this offense unless, based on the 
evidence you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 
1. In Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant KEN JOHNSON; 
2. Knowingly, intentionally or recklessly; 
3. Entered or remained unlawfully in the dwelling of another; and 
· 4. With the specific intent to commit: 
a. A theft; or 
b. An assault on any person. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence you are convinced of the truth of each 
and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that one or more of these elements 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ ____.1..._q _ _ 
Count 1 charges the defendant with burglary. Trespassing is a lesser included offense of that 
charge. As you deliberate, you must detem1ine whether the defendant is guilty ofburglary_guilty 
of trespassing or not guilty of either offense. The law does not require you to make these 
determinations in any particular order. However, you cannot find the defendant guilty of both 
burglary and trespass In other words, you can only return one verdict on count 1: guilty of 
burglary, guilty of trespassing, or not guilty of either offense. 
The elements for burglary] are set forth in Instruction .25{ 
The elements for trespassing are set forth in Instruction 30 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 0 
--=----
The crime of trespassing consists of a number of elements each of which must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to prove even one 
yJ element beyond a reasonable doubt you must find the defendant not guilty. 
A person is guilty of criminal trespass if under circumstances not amounting to 
burglary: 
(a) the person enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any 
VfJ Property O g 
(ii) intends to commit ~riy crime, other than theft or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the 
safety of another; 
or 
(b) knowing the person's entry or presence is unlawful, the person enters 
or remains on property as to which notice against entering is given by personal 
communication to the actor by the owner or someone with apparent authority to act 
for the owner. 
?. r-1 -'] 
































INSTRUCTION NO. :)I 
Under the laws of the State of Utah, a person commits Burglary if that person enters or 
remains unlawfully in a dwelling or any portion of a dwelling with intent tO-Cgmm.it a felel'ly or 
theft or to commit an assault on any person. 
2 7 { I!. 
Instruction No. - .... 3 ....... '2-=----
The following definitions apply to Count I: 
1. "Dwelling" means a building vJhich is usually occupied by a person 
lodging in the building at night, whether or not a person is actually 
present. 
2. Theft. A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof. 
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or to 
use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its economic 
value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it 
unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
3. Assault is: 
{a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to 
do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes 


















Under Otah law a person can commit an offense known as wrongful 
appropriation. Wrongful appropriation is defined as: 
A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another, without the ,consent of 
the owner or legal custodian and with intent to temporarily appropriate, 
possess, or use the property or to temporarily deprive- the owner or legal 
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ADDENDUM C 
Jury questions and trial court's answers (R249,251) 
Addendum C 
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Discussion about court's off-the-record contact with jury and 
playing of the voicemail for jury (R348:49-58,99-104) 
• 
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Okay, when's the last time you were there? 
Just a few months ago. 
Just -
Q Okay. So a few months ago. Okay. And were you 
present on March 30, 2014? 
A I was not. 
Q 
A 
Okay, the day before or the day after? 
I was not. 
MR. STANGER: No further questions. 
MR. BREEZE: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. BREEZE: The defense rests. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's take a break. 
MR. BREEZE: Ten minutes? 
THE COURT: Yes, but I have a few things, don'c 
leave, just let the jury go. 
(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom) 
THE COURT: Is the State planning on putting on 
rebuttal? 
MR. STANGER: Ummm, I believe so, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. I would now just comment that 
there's been some concern about 39 seconds of that tape being 
played. I now think it was relevant since the defendant has 
claimed he was not - had only had one drink - it becomes 




























MR. BREEZE: Now, may I inquire as to what rebuttal 
evidence they intend to bring? 
THE COURT: You two can talk about that. 
MR. BREEZE: Well, I don't want to have to object 
in the presence of the jury and I'm not asking for details 
just give -
MR. STANGER: It's kind of what we have to do, 
Judge. ~ 
THE COURT: What? 
MR. STANGER: It's kind of what we have to do for a 
(inaudible). I don't even know that I -
THE COURT: I don't know that they have 
(inaudible) . 
MR. STANGER: - will but I need to go out and have 
a conversation with Ms. Johnson, Heather Johnson. 
THE COURT: I'm going to give you 10 or 15 minutes 
to decide if you're going to and what it might be and then he 
can discuss it with you. You can let me know before the jury 
comes in (inaudible) sometime outside the presence of the 
jury. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken) 
THE COURT: All right, is the State going to do any 
rebuttal? 
MR. STANGER: Judge, I have spoken with Ms. Johnson, 
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calling her. I don't have any rebuttal evidence. I would 
just ask that she be allowed to leave. She does have wo~k. 
So ... 
THE COURT: Okay. Any objection to that? 
MR. BREEZE: No, and the other two witnesses also 
have the same request. 
THE COURT: Okay, then they are excused. Thanks 
for being here. 
No rebuttal. So we're moving to closings. 
ready for that? 
Are you 
We are not ready for jury instructions. All ri..ght. 
The defendant did testify. I assume defense wants to pu~ in 
their wrongful appropriation? 
MR. BREEZE: Yes. 
THE COURT: How about the lesser included? 
MR. BREEZE: Just one second. 
MR. STANGER: Less, that would be (inaudible) 
wrongful. 
THE COURT: Wrongful, commit the offense of 
wrongful appropriation. 
MR. STANGER: A lesser included of theft that he's 
already admitted it? 
THE COURT: He's just defining it obviously so he 
can claim that was the intent he performed while he was 
inside rather than - since there has been some evidence of 
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that, I'm inclined to let him have it. 
MR. STANGER: Okay. 
THE COURT: We've got a definition of wrongfully, 
wrongful appropriation but then we have argument behind it. 
MR. BREEZE: It's just the theory of the case. 
THE COURT: Which you can argue. I don't think you 
get to submit your theory of the case in a jury instruction. 
You can submit the wrongful appropriation definition but then 
you've got to make your own argument. 
MR. BREEZE: Well, I think that you can instruct 
them that actually isn't that what a theory of the case 
instruction is, that the defendant says this is my theory 
and, you know, I mean, I think at the very bottom we're very 
gracious and say, hey, but you still need to consider the 
theft or the assault count and -
THE COURT: You could but are not required to. 
they find that the facts meet the elements then they are 
required to find someone guilty. 
If 
MR. BREEZE: Would you read that last part again? 
THE COURT: However, bear in mind that if you were 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
entered or remained unlawfully with the intent to commit an 
assault, you could but are not required to find the defendant 
guilty of burglary under the theory or burglary by assault. 





























find him guilty of the theft they could also - and you don't 
mention that in here. Yeah, I'm going to give you the 
wrongful appropriation definition but you're going to have to 
make your own arguments. 
MR. BREEZE: Okay. And of course of objection is 
noted, right? 
included? 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. BREEZE: And -
THE COURT: And you're talking about the lesser 
MR. BREEZE: Right. Yeah, let's go ahead and give 
them that lesser included. 
THE COURT: Do you have a verdict form for me 
including the lesser included? 
MR. BREEZE: I don't. 
MR. STANGER: How is that a lesser included of this 
(inaudible)? I don't think there's been any evidence of 
trespass. The evidence is that he kicked her door in. 
MR. BREEZE: Entering -
MR. STANGER: How does that become a trespass? 
MR. BREEZE: It is a trespass. Trespassing is 
entering unlawfully and, in fact, if you don't have the 
intent, then it is trespassing. 
MR. STANGER: He's testified that he had the intent 
to kick the door d8wn. 
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MR. BREEZE: Well, that's not the intent I'm 
talking about. 
THE COURT: He's talking about the intent to commit 
theft while he was in the house. 
MR. BREEZE: I mean, it's right here, enter or 
remain unlawfully and criminal trespass is definitely a 
lesser included of burglary and if they believe that he 
entered unlawfully then -
THE COURT: But never committed a theft or an 
assault, it's a potential lesser included. 
MR. BREEZE: Right. 
MR. STANGER: He admitted that - I -
THE COURT: Your issue is the intent and the intent 
was formed on the theft. 
MR. STANGER: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. So I'll put them in. I need to 
copy this without the argument. I need to figure out where 
I'm putting them in and I need to number them so that I can 
put (inaudible) instruction which number is which jury 
instruction and then we need to copy them. 
MR. STF .. NGER: Do they have - I'm trying to type 
this up but Mr. Johnson's element instruction on the I'm 
sorry, on the burglary, it says entered or remained in a 
dwelling. I think it needs to say entered or remained 





























get it to the clerk. 
THE COURT: Okay. The other thing, could you put a 
lesser included in your verdict form? 
MR. STANGER: I did not. 
THE COURT: Could you or do you have it? Or can 
you email me -
MR. STANGER: I can make one. I don't have it. 
THE COURT: Oh, you don't have a copy of it? 
MR. STANGER: This is the wrong computer. Thi:3 is 
my team computer so I don't ... 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. STANGER: I can get it to you. 
THE COURT: Okay, (inaudible) verdict form. Okay. 
We need time to do all those things. Let's - I'm going to 
tell the jury that we're working on all this, that there's no 
rebuttal. That we're going to be copying jury instructions 
so it may take a few minutes more than 15 so they don't blame 
it on you. 
MR. BREEZE: Okay. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken) 
THE COURT: Okay, we're back in the matter of state 
of Utah vs. Ken Montey Johnson. Ummm, we got the jury 
instructions copiej. The - I went in and told the jury that 
it had been longer than a 15-break because we were copying 



























had all brought this morning that I had given you the 
opportunity to bring and the State was deciding whether to do 
rebuttal and all that and they said, Well, when we get this 
case are we going to be able to listen to the tapes? Is 
there a transcript of the tapes? So I said there's no 
transcripts of the tapes, we will discuss whether you get to 
hear the tapes. So, since they are admitted into evidence I 
think they should get to hear the 911 tape and the 39 seconds 
that I allowed of the other tape. We'll have to have counsel 
go in and make sure that's all they hear. 
MR. BREEZE: Ummm, I object. Number one, I don't 
believe that they actually were admitted into evidence and as 
- I mean they were marked at my request so that they would be 
on the record for appeal purposes but I don't think they were 
ever formally admitted and we can't let - we can't let the 
lawyers go back and be part of jury deliberations. 
THE COURT: Well, the lawyers are not going to be 
saying anything when they go back. 
MR. BREEZE: Well, I still don't think that it's 
proper and the idea that they're going to have back there a -
that we're going to have to back and supervise their 
listening to the tape is -
THE COURT: The only reason I would let the lawyers 
back is so that you can see that nothing is said to the jury. 
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you brought up, sounded like you were trying to help the 
prosecutor but you brought up that, oh, the whole 39 seconds 
is now relevant, I think that's what you said. 
THE COURT: What I'm doing is supporting my rule in 
admitting it. 
MR. BREEZE: But when it was originally admitted, 
the ruling was that only the part about the, that I went 
over. That -
THE COURT: When I originally admitted it I told 
the State they could start from the beginning and go through 
to the part where the defendant made an admission. The 
reason we did that was because it's too out of context to 
just pull the four seconds out of it. He did what I said. 
That's what I allowed, that's what's been admitted. If they 
want to listen to it, I'm going to let them listen to it. You 
can put your objection on the record. 
MR. BREEZE: Well, we're objecting and one of the 
reasons is that the only reason that you allowed them to play 
the whole 39 seconds was because in the beginning they told 
you there was nothing of significance, it was all innocuous 
until the comment, until the four seconds that mattered. 
TIIS COURT: No one told me things were innocuous. 
I allowed it because it needs to be in the context of the 
phone call that's made and since it was at the beginning of 
what was it, a 4-minute phone call, I felt like 39 seconds 
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was reasonable compared to allowing the whole four minutes. 
Okay. 
MR. BREEZE: And so my objection is on the record, 
right? 
THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
CLERK: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: As I've said before. The only things 
that last in that record are what is scanned in. We no 
longer take physical things any more. You just have to keep 
it {inaudible). 
(Inaudible conversation) G 
THE COURT: Oh no, it's admitted as evidence. 
(Inaudible} . 
MR. BREEZE: But just so the record is clear, it's 
my position that it was never admitted as evidence, neither 
one of those disks, that they were admitted only at my 
request so that they would be available for appellate review. 
THE COURT: They were admitted. I was not thrilled 
with allowing the jury to listen to them but we said we'll 
wait and see if they really want them. Now they want them, 
they've been admitted, we'll let them have them. 
(Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom) 
THE COURT: We're back in the matter of, in the 
presence of the jury, in the matter of the state of Utah vs. 
Ken Montey Johnson. We have jury instructions. We will pass 
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but first I'm going to tell you that the - we have eight 
jurors and one alternate. Our alternate is No. 23 and I'm 
sorry that we do that to you but we've had so many times 
where someone gets in a car wreck or somebody gets sick or 
something like that happens and it's very difficult to do a 
jury trial so we want to make sure that we don't have to do 
it more than once. So you're going to get your lunch and be 
excused. I want you to leave your phone number in case we 
have to call you back. 
(Whereupon the bailiff was sworn) 
(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom at 12: 3 l: 00) 
THE COURT: Have a seat. Anything we need the 
record for? 
MR. BREEZE: Not really, I just assume we just need 
to give our cell numbers to the clerk and stay within 15 
minutes. 
THE COURT: Ten would be better. Ummm, I'm going 
to have the prosecutor show the bailiff how to play those 
things, probably just the bailiff will go in. 
MR. STANGER: Are they going to eat lunch first? 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. STANGER: Okay, I wonder how long that w il.L 
take. 
THE COURT: So yeah, leave your numbers. Your 





























MR. BREEZE: No, I sold that place and I moved down 
to 3900 South. 
THE COURT: Oh. The problem is we often have 
questions and stuff that we'll end up having to call you back 
for. 
MR. BREEZE: I plan on staying close by. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BREEZE: I would like to be present when he 
gives the instructions to the bailiff. So do we have any 
idea of when that is going to be? Q 
THE COURT: No, probably within the next half hour 
I would hope. 
CLERK: I can have him come back in (inaudible) . 
THE COURT: Lock them up and then we' 11 get him out 
here. Ask Jason to come on back. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken until 2:14:34) 
THE COURT: We're back in state vs. Ken Montey 
Johnson. There were a couple of questions while the jury was 
out. We kept them so that you could take a look at them and 
how I answered them. Do we have them? 
CLERK: (Inaudible) . 
THE COURT: They asked whether you could formulate 
intent only before entering or after entering and they asked 
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to you in case you want to put any objections on the record. 
MR. BREEZE: Do you remember what the Instruction 
33 was? 
THE COURT: Yes, it's the one about, ummm, the 
temporary taking, what's it called? 
MR. STANGER: Appropriation. 
MR. BREEZE: Oh, appropriation? 
THE COURT: I think so. So I basically said what's 
in that jury instruction, you determine which instructions 
are important·and to read them as a whole and ... 
MR. BREEZE: But it doesn't say read them as a -
well you said -
THE COURT: Yes, it does in that jury instruction. 
MR. BREEZE: Let me just take a look here. 
{Inaudible conversation) 
THE COURT: These instructions I gave you before 
the trial, any instructions I may give to you and these 
instructions. All instructions are important, you should 
consider them as a whole. The order in which the 
instructions are given does not mean that some instructions 
are more important than others. Whether any particular 
instruction applies may depend upon what you decide are the 
true facts of the case. 
Also refers to the argument because I know that was 
part of your argument you wanted them to consider. So that's 
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why I mentioned argument as well. 
MR. BREEZE: And so just for the record, we object 
to what you gave on the question regarding the reason for 
Instruction No. 33. We believe that Your Honor should have 
said because, words to the effect of because the defendant's 
theory of the case is that he only wanted to temporarily 
deprive and so for that reason we move for a mistrial. 
THE COURT: Allowing them to decide the 
significance of the instruction based on their own theories 
of argument and testimony is the appropriate way to go rather 
than to restate defendant's theory so I'm going to deny your 
motion for a mistrial and allow it to stand. 
Okay, I guess we' re ready to bring the jury in. 
(Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom at 2:22:10} 
THE COURT: We're back in the matter of state of 
Utah vs. Ken Montey Johnson. The jury has indicated that 
they have a verdict. The foreperson, give me their number. 
FOREPERSON: No. 3. 
THE COURT: All right, and you've reached a 
verdict? 
FOREPERSON: Yes, we have. 
THE COURT: Would you hand it to the bailiff 
please? We'll have the clerk read that. 
CLERK: We, the jury empaneled in the above 
entitled action, find the defendant, Ken Montey Johnson, 
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Count 1, burglary, guilty. Count 2, threat of violence, not 
guilty. Signed and dated. 
THE COURT: All right. Would anyone like the jury 
polled? 
I'll just 
MR. BREEZE: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'll go through each one and 
ask you to tell me 
Number l? 
JUROR 1: Yes. 
THE COURT: Number 
JUROR 2: Yes. 
THE COURT: Number 
JUROR 3: Yes. 
THE COURT: Number 
JUROR 8: Yes. 
THE COURT: Nine? 





THE COURT: And ten? 
JUROR 10: Yes. 
THE COURT: Eleven? 
JUROR 11: Yes. 
THE COURT: Seventeen? 
JUROR 17: Yes. 
that was your verdict. 
THE COURT: Your service is now completed. You can 
discuss the case with anybody that you want to. We'll take 
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you back to your jury room. You're welcome to leave if you 
want or if you have any questions I'll be back in just a 
couple of minutes. 
(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom} 
THE COURT: Have a seat. So we need to set a 
sentencing date. Are we going to get a presentence report 
from AP&P? 
MR. STANGER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, it takes them 45 days. 
That's going to put us out to about November 21 st • Do we 
have a calendar on that date? Q 
date. 
MR. STANGER: I think I have a sentencing on that 
CLERK: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Does that work for you? 
MR. BREEZE: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. STANGER: Judge, based on the conviction the 
State would ask that he be taken into custody. We bel~eve he 
poses a danger based on his conduct throughout this case and 
pursuant to the statute the presumption is that he goes into 
custody on the felony two conviction. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. Do you wish to respond 
to that? 
MR. BREEZE: Yes, it's under 77-20 and the - you 
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after Mr. Johnson had left the home did you fill this out, do 
you remember? 
A I don't remember how long it was exactly but it was 
pretty quickly after. The officer was there pretty quickly. 
Q Okay. So you were still shaking? 
A Oh yeah, yes. 
Q Okay. And is that the statement written to the best 




Describe your thoughts at that time. 
A I still just couldn't believe everything that had 
just happened. I was scared. I've never been scared like 










And is that - is that your statement actually? 
Yes. 
And how do you know that's your statement? 
'Cause that's what happened and that's what I 
Okay. And is your name written on that? 
Yes. 
Has your signature on the document? 
Yes. 
MR. STANGER: State would move to admit State's 
Exhibit 4 into evidence. 
MR. BREEZE: It's clearly hearsay. She can testify 
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about what she wants to testify about. This is a statement 
made by a declarant, the declarant does not make while 
testifying at the trial or hearing. It's hearsay. 
MR. STANGER: Inconsistent statement, Judge. 
THE COURT: Prior inconsistent statement? 
MR. STANGER: (Inaudible). Thjs particular 
statement was made under penalty of perjury. 
THE COURT: I 1 m going to admit it. 
MR. BREEZE : Wait, Your Honor, is it - may be the 
prosecutor could tell us what this is offered to rebut as 
required by Rule 801D(l) (b). Q 
THE COURT: 
(Coughing). Sorry. 
(Inaudible) cross examination. 
MR. STANGER: If i could retrieve that document. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q (BY MR. STANGER} So, when you talked to 911 and 
you told them about him breaking in -
MR. BREEZE: Objection -
Q (BY MR. STANGER) Is that right? She's already 
testified to it. 
MR. BREEZE: You just testified. You told them 
about blank, he wants her to say yes. The proper form of the 
question is what did you tell them. 
MR. STANGER: She's previously testified to it. I 
can ask it again. 
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Q (BY MR. STANGER) When you spoke with 911 did you 
tell them about -
MR. BREEZE: Objection, leading question. He 
should ask what did she tell 911. 
THE COURT: It's hard to respond for me right now. 
Why don't you just ask her what she said. 
Q (BY MR. STANGER) What did you say to 911 about 
what he did to you? 
MR. BREEZE: First we would like foundation to show 
that she actually remembers what she said to 911. 
MR. STANGER: She's already testified to that. 
MR. BREEZE: I'm just asking for a foundation. 
THE COURT: Do you know what you said to 911? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: What did you say? 
THE WITNESS: About him pushing me, grabbing my 
wrist and pushing me down the stairs. 





And what did you say in your statement regarding 
that same incident? 
A In my written statement I believe I said the same 





































Do you remember - did you talk to a Detective 
Yes. 
- about this case? Do you rem8mber when that 
Ummm, I think it was a week, week and a half later. 
Okay. At that time did you talk about - what did 
you tell - ~ 
MR. BREEZE: I'm going to object -
MR. STANGER: I haven't even asked the question, 
Judge. G 
MR. BREEZE: The cats out of the bag. He's about 
to say did you tell the detective blank, have her say yes. 
The proper form of the question is what did you tell the 
detective. 
MR. STANGER: I've got to be able to ask the 
question. 
THE COURT: All right. Go back a step (coughing}. 
Under hearsay - I don't know what is happening to me now, of 
course now (coughing). The declarant's prior - if the 
declarant testifies (coughing) and is subject to cross 
examination under D-1 about a prior statement and the 
statement is consistent with the declarant's testimony, 
that's all it takes. The rest are 'or' or that denies 
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I'm going to admit it. 
MR. BREEZE: Well, wait a minute, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I've ruled (coughing). (Inaudible) . 
MR. BREEZE: Well, I wanted to make my objection 
and say a - the rule says a prior consistent statement if 
it's offered to rebut an express or implied charge that the 
declarant recently fabricated. There's nothing to rebut. 
THE COURT: That's under an 'or', D-l(a) says, uis 
consistent with the declarant's testimony." 
MR. BREEZE: It says 'and'. 
THE COURT: It says 'or' in my rules. 
MR. BREEZE: Well, you're looking at D-l(a). 
THE COURT: So it's admissible under D-1 (a) . The 
other ones are 'or's. 
MR. BREEZE: If you look at D-l(b) you and the 
prosecutor both claimed that this is a consistent statement. 
Under D-l(b) a consistent statement can only be offered to 
rebut. 
THE COURT: Now where (coughing}. 
MR. BREEZE: It says it has to be consistent with 
the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut. 
THE COURT: Where, what one are you under? 
MR. BREEZE: That's 0-l(b), that's Rule 801A-D-
1 ( b} . 
THE COURT: That's an 'or'. 
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MR. BREEZE: No, it says 'and' . You' re look inq at-
THE COURT: I'm looking at O-l(a), it finishes with 
'or'. So if it's under 0-1 ( a) it's admissible or it could be 
admissible under 1 ( b) . I don't need both l(a) and 1 ( b) . It 
says 'or'. 
MR. BREEZE: Well, Your Honor -
THE COURT: I'm going to admit it. 
MR. STANGER: I apologize to the jury then? 
THE COURT: Yes. 




A Yes, I did. 
Q And did you recount what happened? 
A Yes, I told him everything that -
Q 
MR. BREEZE: Excuse me, I couldn't hear that last 
comment. 
THE COURT: He asked if she recounted what 
happened. 
MR. BREEZE: No, the answer. 
THE WITNESS: I said yes, I told him everyth~ng 
that happened. 
Q (BY MR. STANGER) Did you talk to - did you talk to 
him about these punches that you testified about? 
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Q Okay. Did you receive a phone call from Mr. 
Johnson after this happened? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay, did he talk to you about - what was the phone 




The phone call was a voice mail. 
Okay, and what was that regarding? 
Ummm, he was still very angry with me, yelling at 
me, pretty much telling me that, Go ahead, get him arrested 
for kicking down my door. I don't really remember exactly 
everything he said on there because I only heard it two or 
three times. 
Q Did you record - you have that voice mail? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And did you provide that to Detective 
Herbert? 
A Yes. 
MR. STANGER: I don't know if you want to break. I 
need to set up the phone call. 
THE COURT: Oh, all right. 
MR. STANGER: If you want to break for lunch. 
THE COURT: We' 11 go ahead and have a break for 
1 unch. Come back at 1: 0 0, you' re on your own (coughing) . 
(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom) 
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MR. BREEZE: Your Honor, I have to again I'm moving 
for a mistrial. You've misread the rule of evidence allowing 
the statement in is completely unlawful. D-1 (a) says that it 
is -
THE COURT: It starts with D-1, "A declarants 
witness prior statement. The declarant testifies and is 
subject to cross examination about a prior statement and the 
statement D-l(a) is consistent with the declarant's testimony 
or the declarant denies having made the statement, or has 
forgotten or" all these things. It only has to be one of 
those things. ~ 
MR. BREEZE: Well, number one, nobody is claiming 
that it was inconsistent with her testimony -
THE COURT: That's why it's -
MR. BREEZE: - that she's just given and a 
declarant had not denied making the statement or has 
forgotten and then (coughing) you get to {b) it's allowed if 
it's consistent and offered to rebut an express or impli~d 
charge that the declarant (coughing) fabricated. 
THE COURT: Didn't she just say she didn't rem~mber 
whether she told them that he threw punches, so we have 
something that's been forgotten. 
MR. BREEZE: There may be one thing; however, j_f 
you look at the statement itself, it doesn't mention anything 
about punches. In fact -
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THE COURT: So it's inconsistent. 
MR. BREEZE: Right. But inconsistent is only 
allowed if it's offered to rebut a charge that she fabr ic:ated 
and so you've allowed this in, in the absence of - there's no 
claim that she fabricated this. 
know where the exhibit it but -
(Coughing) . And I don't. 
THE COURT: So which are you going after, 
inconsistent or consistent? 
MR. BREEZE: Well, it's not admissible under either 
because first of all -
THE COURT: She's already testified - you' re saying 
it's inconsistent -
MR. BREEZE: I'm not saying -
THE COURT: - a second ago. 
MR. BREEZE: - they're the ones that are offering 
it. They're claiming - actually they didn't claim anything. 
You claimed that this written statement is inconsistent with 
the defendant's testimony. 
THE COURT: I've been going - I was assuming 
they're going under consistent. Why don't we have you tell 
me? 
MR. STANGER: We are going with it's consistent, 
prior consistent statement. 
MR. BREEZE: Well, I think he just said consistent, 
is that what he said? 
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THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. BREEZE: Okay, if it's consistent, I see he 
doesn't have his rules of evidence here, if it's consistent 
it has to be offered to rebut a claim of fabrication. 
unaware of any claims at this stage of the trial of a 
fabrication. 
I'm 
THE COURT: (Coughing} . Let's wait and see what 
happens on cross. Is there anything else? 
MR. STANGER: No, Judge. 
MR. BREEZE: I take it you're denying our motion 
for a mistrial at this stage? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
(Whereupon a noon recess was taken) 
THE COURT: All right, we're back in the matter of 
state of Utah vs. Ken Montey Johnson. After I stopped having 
a coughing fit, which I've had this since Friday, that's the 
first time that has happened. I got a chance to read through 
the hearsay and I think Mr. Breeze is correct. I was reading 
them all as consis·cent, but that first one is inconsistent, 
the other ones are consistent. 
MR. STANGER: Judge, I think it comes in under 
alternative theories as well, so it comes in as a presen~ 
sense impression. She testified that she -
THE COURT: (Inaudible) . 
MR. STANGER: - was at or near the time of the 
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event that happened, so ... 
THE COURT: So at any rate, let's hold it back 
until we get through cross and decide about all of these 
together. In the meantime I don't think, I do think it may 
qualify under some of these other exceptions under 803. I 
don't think having it in the jury's hands for two minutes is 
a big enough error yet to declare a mistrial. 
MR. BREEZE: Your Honor, I am concerned that I kind 
of had to tussle with you in the presence of the jury -
THE COURT: And I will tell the jury that you were 
being insistent because you were right, okay? 
MR. BREEZE: Okay. And then I guess -
THE COURT: I'll let them know I was wrong, you 
were right. Okay. 
MR. STANGER: I don't know if you wanted to hear 
the - that he had made a motion that to hear the phone call 
before -
THE COURT: Oh yeah, how long is it? Why don't you 
just play it read quick. You got it all keyed up? 
MR. STANGER: It's like three minutes. 
THE COURT: Okay, let's hear it before the jury 
comes back in. It is not in right now. So that's another 
reason I'm going to leave it away from them so that they know 
that you were right and I didn't, I shouldn't have given it 
to them yet. 
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MR. BREEZE: Was it published? 
THE COURT: I don't know. Did you ever hand it: to 
the jury? 
MR. STANGER: Yes, I handed it to the jury. 
THE COURT: Okay. So we'll take it back from them 
so they know -
MR. STANGER: It should be with you now. Urnmm, 
you've got to get the right amount -
THE COURT: They were looking at me like what's 
matter with you, so ... 
MR. STANGER: I'll get it level so it's not 
vibrating (inaudible). 
(Phone message played - not transcribed) 
THE COURT: It's pretty hard to understand. 
the 
there any way to make it clearer or do you have a transcript? 
MR. STANGER: I don't have a transcript of it. 
Ummm -
MR. BREEZE: May I just comment? I think that to 
the extent that the comment is, you know, that there's a 
confession in there that "I entered the house," I think 5_t's 
allowable although the whole tape is extremely prejudicial 
and we're willing to stipulate that he entered the home 
without consent and that he kicked in the door. We're 
willing to stipulate to that -
MR. STANGER: I don't understand why we' re in 1.:rial 
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if that's the stipulation -
THE COURT: Because then you've got the element of 
commit a theft or an assault. 
MR. STANGER: He's already admitted to the theft. 
So what are we trying? I don't understand. If he's 
stipulating that he entered the home -
MR. BREEZE: Obviously now I understand why we're 
in trial here. The prosecutor doesn't understand the 
elements of the offense. At any rate, all of the stuff, it's 
too prejudicial, all of this £-you this, vindictive, f-you, 
all of that is too prejudicial. None of that goes to prove 
any element. To the extent that there i£ a confession in 
there, the four seconds of that, we don't object -
THE COURT: At what point does the four seconds of 
that come? I was listening for that and I'm having a hax·d 
time -
MR. STANGER: Arrest me for the breaking and 
entering, whatever you think I did to you. It's kind of at 
the front end of that. 
MR. BREEZE: But we're willing to -
THE COURT: Why don't you just play the front end 
of it then? 
MR. BREEZE: We're willing to stipulate to that and 
- but here's a problem. All the rest of that, everything 



























the offense is 404B evidence. We made a request for them to 
produce, they've never given us notice and now they want to 
come in and bring all this, you know, f-you, you're a 
b-i-t-c-h, you know, and all of this horribly prejudicial 
material that doesn't have anything to do with any element in 
the case. So our position is if they want to play the four 
seconds, fine. It's technically not a confession but we'll 
still not object to that or in the alternative you can just 
tell them that we've agreed and stipulated that he did in 
fact enter the house without - over her objection and he 
kicked in the door, kicked the door open. 
THE COURT: Do you want a stipulation or do you 
want the front part of that tape? 
MR. STANGER: I mean, I want the front part of the 
tape 'cause I've already told the jury I'm going to play it 
for them. Ummm - ~ut I ... 
THE COURT: I'm going to allow the part where he 
discusses coming into the house. We don't have to go through 
the whole three minutes. You can discuss that it's three 
minutes long but that's the only pertinent part. Okay. 
MR. BREEZE: All right and then - okay, you're 
going to explain to the jury about the -
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). Let's get the 
jury back. 
MR. BREEZE: We should make sure that he's got it 
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cued up to that part before we bring them in. 
THE COURT: It's the beginning, isn't it? 
MR. BREEZE: Well, I think there's a little before. 
It would just be nice to have it cued up. 
THE COURT: Yeah, you may get stuck with what' .s 
before. It's going to be hard to cue it up to exactly before 
the statement he's looking for. 
(Tape played again) 
MR. STANGER: I mean, that's what he's talking 
about so I think that's -
THE COURT: Yeah, start at the beginning. 
hard to understand. 
MR. BREEZE: We'd object. 
(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom) 
It's so 
THE COURT: Okay, we're back in the presence of the 
jury on the matter of the State of Utah versus Ken Montey 
Johnson. I'm going to tell you after {inaudible) done and 
I'm starting with a cough drop early before I have a problem. 
After getting my tears out of my eyes and reading the hearsay 
statement, defense counsel is correct, which is probably_why 
he's having a hard time with me, because he's right that the 
statement is not admissible under Rule 801. So we have taken 
it back from you for now. It's not admissible at this point 
in the trial. He's right; I was wrong. So we'll go ahead 
and let the state -
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MR. BREEZE: Nothing further. 
MR. STANGER: Sorry. 
FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. STANGER: 
Q Did you think Mr. Johnson was going to give you 
your phone back? 
A No. 
Q So at the time he left your house, did you believe 
you were ever going to get your phone back? 
A No. 
MR. STANGER: No further questions. 
TfiE COURT: All right, you can step down. Do we 
need a break? W 
MR. STANGER: I think so, yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay, we'll take a 10-minute break. 
(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom) 
THE COURT: Have a seat. Anything we need to 
discuss outside the presence of the jury? 
MR. BREEZE: Excuse me, just or.e second. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. BREEZE: I had made another motion for a 
mistrial at the bench conference because the prosecutor 
didn't just play the four seconds indicated in the tape. He 




























f-that, very prejudicial. We asked that that not happen and 
then all of a sudden, boom, there it goes right in front of 
the jury. 
THE COURT: I didn't say that there wasn't ever 
going to be an f-this or f-that. What I said was just play 
the beginning of the tape. 
MR. BREEZE: And we had argued that if you allowed 
him to do that, that there's - what's going to happen is that 
bad things are going to come in and we asked that you have 
him cue it up to the relevant portion and play that only. 
THE COURT: And I told him he could play it from 
the beginning. 
MR. BREEZE: Yes, and for that reason and in light 
of the prejudicial f-this and f-that that came in, we're 
asking for a mistrial. 
THE COURT: That's all in the context of what he 
said. They didn't play more than what, 10 seconds of that 
tape? 
MR. STANGER: It went, it went -
MR. BREEZE: Thirty-nine seconds. 
THE COURT: Thirty-nine seconds. That's cutting 
pretty tight. 
MR. BREEZE: That's -
THE COURT: I'm not going to declare a mistrial 






























statements about kicking the door in. 
MR. BREEZE: One followup on that point, at some 
point the prosecutor is going to need to just make, have a 
copy burned of only the relevant four seconds because if it's 
going to go back -
THE COURT: Well, let's just not have it go back 
unless he wants to try to burn the four seconds. 
MR. STANGER: I think if they request we can 
probably do it, but ... 
THE COURT: Okay. Right now I'm just thinking I'd 
hate to think of them playing it back and forth and back and 
forth, you know, trying to make out every word of it. 
Anything else? 
MR. BREEZE: No. 
MR. STANGER: And Judge, I think the door was 
opened to the 911 tape being played. 
MR. BREEZE: We totally disagree. We played one 
discreet section that dealt only with - to impeach her 
because of prior existing statement, that's all we did and 
we're entitled to do that. 
THE COURT: I think, ummm, you have expressly or 
implied that the declarant has fabricated at some point both 
on her 911 tape and in her statement. So I think you have 
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MR. BREEZE: Well, I think that the record would 
have to disclose what - instead of just a general you have 
opened, I think you have to say this question or that 
question has -
THE COURT: Saying that she didn't discuss punching 
in the statement, saying that whether it was a should th~ow 
you down the stairs or could or whichever. 
MR. BREEZE: So now under Rule 801 the prosecutor, 
if they want to can come back with a consistent statement. 
That's their, that's all they can do. She's been impeached 
with prior inconsistent statements. Now they can come back 
and show prior consistent statements. That's all they 
doesn't have any -
THE COURT: There are things consistent in that 
statement with what her testimony has been. 
MR. BREEZE: Well, not really but I guess they 
could try. They could come back with prior - they can come 
back now since she's off the stand, they could come back and 
offer prior consistent statements. But that's all they can 
do. 
THE COURT: But they have offered it. They've 
offered in that written statement. They don't have to put 
her back on the stand. 
MR. BREEZE: Well -
THE COURT: At any rate -
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MR. BREEZE: - and -
THE COURT: I don't know what they're going to 
offer, so ... 
MR. BREEZE: Well, they'd have to articulate 
exactly what statement it is in that document that they'~e 
talking about that is a consistent statement. The whole 
thing doesn't come in, just only the consistent statement 
that they believe is in there, they can get that in. 
can have it read into the record by the detective. 
They 
THE COURT: Well, all these b~ts and pieces of 
things ... You're taking a bunch of stuff out of context and I 
don't think it's appropriate or helpful for the jury and when 
we start taking bits and pieces of things, it just makes me 
want to admit the whole tr.ing. 
MR. BREEZE: Well, unfortunately we find ourselves 
in situations where a witness in a diary might have 390 
pages-
THE COURT: Well, this isn't a diary -
MR. BREEZE: That's just an example. 
THE COURT: - it's a paragraph. 
MR. BREEZE: They have 390 pages of comments in a 
diary -
THE COURT: Three hundred and ninety pages is not a 
helpful example -







































THE COURT: - when we are dealing with one 
paragraph. 
MR. BREEZE: If there's one statement in a 3 9 O-;--page 
diary that is prior consistent, they can elicit that prior 
consistent statement. They do not get to admit the entire 
diary. 
THE COURT: How about if the entire diary is 
consistent -
MR. BREEZE: Well, then they need to-
THE COURT: - with -
MR. BREEZE: - go through and itemize every 
statement in there that's consistent and make their argument 
to Your Honor. But they can't just go, Oh, let's throw the 
whole diary in, there's a one-page or one-sentence consistent 
statement on Page 294, let's throw the whole thing in there. 
THE COURT: Everything is looking pretty consistent 
to me. All right. 
What's the State's response? 
MR. STANGER: The State stated what she's 
testified, as to what's in that statement. She was cros.:ied 
on it, she's been alleged to have been not truthful and that 
there are inconsistent - I think the statement can come in to 
show that -
MR. BREEZE: You need to tell us what statement in 
that -
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MR. STANGER: The entire statement is consistent. 
MR. BREEZE: We need to go through -
THE COURT: No, we do not need to go through line 
by line. It's consistent. It's a consi=.tent statement 
offered to rebut an express or implied charge that the 
declarant recently fabricated that (inaudible) improper 
influence which you have also put in by talking about the 
money owed. It is admissible under 801-D ( 1} (b) . It's also 
admissible under 803 -
MR. BREEZE: Okay, here's -
THE COURT: - recorded recollection, No. 5. 
MR. BREEZE: No. 1, though, Your Honor, we have to 
address each of those. It is not a recorded recollection. 
It doesn't meet the requirement of that. A recorded 
recollection is only a matter that the witness once knew 
about but now cannot recall well enough to testify. 
THE COURT: Fully and accurately. 
MR. BREEZE: Right, and that's -
THE COURT: Well you' re saying she's not accurate. 
MR. BREEZE: Well, as to various comments. 
THE COURT: And then there's things she says I 
don't remember. 
MR. BREEZE: And then the present sense impres:~ion, 
this is - she testified herself -
THE COURT: I didn't say present sense - I just 
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said recorded recollection. 
MR. BREEZE: Well, this is - doesn't meet the 
requirements of a recorded recollection and if we look at the 
report, Your Honor, the -
THE COURT: What report? 
MR. BREEZE: I'm sorry, the 1102 statement -
THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
MR. BREEZE: It starts out "my exhusband came home 
drunk and I did not want to answer the door." That's not in 
dispute. 
THE COURT: "Came to my home drunk, I did not want 
to answer the door." That is a consistent 
MR. BREEZE: That is -
THE COURT: - it's consistent with the testimony 
she's given. 
MR. BREEZE: But we - it doesn't - it does not 
rebut any of the claims that we've made allegedly of 
fabrication. This has nothing to do with any of her 
inconsistent statements. He started kicking the back door. 
That's not disputed. There's nothing in there about -
THE COURT: It's another consistent statement. 
MR. BREEZE: But you can only bring in a statement 
- if we were claiming, if we were making a claim that he 
never kicked in the door. If we were claiming that she made 
that up and fabricated that, then they could come in and try 
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to have a prior co~sistent - neither one of those address 
something that's, t.hat we've challenged and "I grabbed my 
phone and was yelling at him to leave the broke door and I 
called 911. He took my phone and would not give it back." 
THE COURT: To leave, period. "He broke the door 
in. I called 911." 
MR. BREEZE: And none of these - there's been no 
allegation that any of these particular statements are 
fabricated. "He was still yelling at me, that I owe him 
money and will not give it back." That is not - we are not, 
we have not said that that is fabricated. 
Then we got to the front door and he was still 
trying to get my phone back or excuse me, "I was still trying 
to get my phone back" to call 911 and then - and so that last 
statement arguably could be read in by the detective. Then 
he pushed me and said, she never claimed at any time during 
her testimony that he pushed her. And so they can't read in 
that one. And I should just push - or he should just push me 
down the stairs. That is, could arguably come in. But then 
he got in his truck and I ran to the neighbor's house, that's 
undisputed. That is not something that we've claimed 
fabrication on. 
So the whole report doesn't come in. They can get 
the detective up there and ask him, you know, those three 
sentences that are allegedly fabricated but the whole, entire 
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report does not come in. 
THE COURT: Is that everything? 
MR. BREEZE: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Does the State have a 
response to that? 
MR. STANGER: Judge, I think the rule, the rule of 
completeness, I don't we can just put these bits and pie~es 
in. It has to be complete statement for the jury to read and 
be able to judge for itself. It goes to the weight of her 
testimony and he's challenged her, as to her bias and 
everything else. So I think to get the complete, the rule of 
completeness requires that we do this, that they be allowed 
to look at it and judge for themselves. 
MR. BREEZE: The hearsay rule -
THE COURT: You said you were done. 
MR. BREEZE: - the rule -
THE COURT: We're not going to go back and forth 
and back and forth forever. 
MR. BREEZE: Okay, the hearsay rule says what it 
says. This alleged rule of completeness does not overrule 
the hearsay rule. These statements are, none of them except 
the three that I pointed out, are prior consistent statements 
that are going to be offered by the government to rebut an 
implied or express charge of fabrication, only those three 
can come in. I mean those are the ones that matter anyway. 
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THE COURT: All right. We have referred too much 
to the statement of what's in it and what's not in it to just 
not let the jury read this paragraph. So I'm going to admit 
State's Exhibit No. 4. 
MR. BREEZE: And of course, we object and make n 
motion for a mistrial. 
THE COURT: You have objected. 
MR. BREEZE: I mean, it's clearly not admissible 
and Your Honor wants to let it in for some reason that there 
is not, that is unknown to me. I'm unaware of any legal 
authority to support your position. 
THE COURT: I have given you the legal authority to 
support it. You have referred to it repeatedly. You ca::1 't 
keep pulling bits and piece of it out and expect that itrs 
not going to go into evidence. 
MR. BREEZE: That's what we do, we refresh 
recollection -
THE COURT: We are done -
MR. BREEZE: - through documents. 
THE COURT: - discussing this topic. I allowed you 
to say everything you had to say and I'v8 ruled. 
Are there any other topics we need to discuss? 
MR. STANGER: Judge, the State wishes to play the -
THE COURT: The 911 tape. 
MR. STANGER: Yep. 
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MR. BREEZE: It's prejudicial -
THE COURT: I haven't heard the whole 911 tape. 
Let me hear it. 
MR. STANGER: I have that. I mean from the - I 
think we've already talked about - no putting the part on 
where the neighbor is talking. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
(911 tape is played for the Court - not transcribed) 
THE COURT: Any more clear with the volume down? 
MR. STANGER: I can .... 
THE COURT: No. It's just (inaudible). 
MR. BREEZE: Do you want it up or down? 
THE COURT: No, it's, you know, it's not any more 
understandable either way. 
(Tape played) 
THE COURT: That's it? 
MR. BREEZE: I think so. Here's the problem, Your 
Honor. The - if they want to take statements out of this 
tape so that they can rehabilitate her testimony by showing 
that she made prior consistent statements, that's fine. Let 
them take it step-by-step, statement-by-statement and let's 
go through each one and see if it actually is admissible~ 
First we'll have to determine whether that particular 
statement relates to some allegation of fabrication. Th<:n we 
have to go and decide well is it too prejudicial and each 
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statement in there has to be analyzed and because here's the 
definition of statement - hearsay means a statement that 
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial 
or hearing, definitely this; and a party offers in evidence 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. 
So obviously we've got a statement that she made while nut 
testifying and I cannot imagine the State is offering it for 
any other reason that to claim that all these statements are 
true and now if they're getting up to say, Hey, we're not 
claiming that any of these statements are true, you know, 
then they can claim that it's not hearsay but why would they 
want to put it in and then tell the jury first that they're 
not claiming it's true? 
So it's all hearsay. Some of it could possibly 
come in as consistent prior statements but we have to get 
each one itemized. If you just listen to the whole thing, 
there's nothing really new in the whole tape that we hav~n't 
already got testimony of. 
THE COURT: Which makes it a prior consistent 
statement except for the one that you pulled out. 
MR. BREEZE: Well no, it's - you're missing the 
point, Your Honor, they don't take each statement that's in 
there so we have to look at each sentence -
THE COURT: Yes, I understood that and I listened 
to all the statements and most of them has been testified to 
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and is consistent with what she has said so far and is 
consistent with what she has in this written statement except 
for the uhe tried to push her down the stairs" versus ''he 
threatened to push me down the stairs." 
MR. BREEZE: First, it's they have to - you know -
they have to be able to identify a statement in there and 
say, Hey, the defense made an implied charge of fabrication 
against her with regard to this statement, therefore, we want 
to play this statement to show that it's prior and it's 
consistent. 
THE COURT: Yes, I heard that. 
MR. BREEZE: And they cannot just play the whole 
tape. If you really look through this thing of the f~ve 
minutes of the tape, there's probably about 17 seconds of 
consistent stateme~ts that are legitimate material here and 
that's all and so we've got, you know, four minutes and 43 
seconds of irrelevant material that's prejudice, it's 
irrelevant too. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) stuff about the address and 
the property out back and stuff like that. The only reason I 
don't want to let you play it because it's so horrible to 
hear and there's no transcript to help the jury understand. 
I mean, it's - I hear some consistent statements and I hear 
some stuff that I can't even tell what it is and I hear some, 
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consistent. 
All right, I'm going to think about it. Let's be 
back in five minutes. The jury has already been out there 
for ... 
(Whereupon a recess was taken) 
THE COURT: Okay, we' re back ir, the matter of the 
state of Utah vs. Ken Montey Johnson, outside the presence of 
the jury. 
Just wait a minute. 
Umrnm, we discussed earlier the statement which I'm 
going to allow and I was taking my time to make a decision on 
the 911 tape. I've listened to the 911 tape, you can he~r 
the defendant's excitement on the tape. She testified that 
she was still shaking as she stood at the front door and ran 
out and called 911. I hear many statements on that tape 
which are consistent with testimony she has given prior, I 
hear one that is not consistent. I'm going to allow the 
State to play it based on excited utterance and then existing 
emotional and physical condition as well as consistent 
statements that have been brought into question now. 
So if you want to put her back on the stand to do 
that, go ahead or you can just play it. 
MR. BREEZE: One question, the - I guess it's 
Exhibit No. 4, the statement, just so the record is clear, 
what was the legal justification for that one? I just 
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THE COURT: It is now a consistent statement which 
is offered to rebut and express an implied charge the 
declarant recently fabricated it or acted from an improper 
influence or motive. You've indicated she had an improp(=r 
influence or motive that she was trying to make this stuif up 
in order to not have to pay money and you've also thrown into 
question things that she did not include in here and so it 
only seems fair that it should be put in to show the things 
that she did include. And again, on both of these, if we're 
going to show bits and pieces and constantly refer to them, 
it only seems fair that the jury gets to hear it. Okay. 
So are you going to put her back on the stand? 
MR. STANGER: Yes, yeah, I don't know if Mr. Breeze 
(inaudible) Ms. Fowers. I have subpoenaed her. I have been 
trying to get her here since this morning. She is suppo~edly 
on her way and didn't - is moving and did not, said she 
wasn 1 t aware but I have - I mean, I was in - I was sending 
her emails and Mr. Herbert was contacting her for me as well 
trying to get her here. So she knew about this hearing. I 
don't - she is the next witness. I've tried to get her to 
respond as to how far she is away and she said she's chahging 
her clothes and is on her way. 
THE COURT: You're calling Detective Herbert aren't 
you? 
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ADDENDUMF 
Victi1n's written witness statement (State's Exhibit #4) 
Addendum F 
.... 
Jarnc.:s i\'1. \Vinder 
Sheriff, Sult Lnkc Count:,, 
Scott Ca rvc:r 
Urnb:·shc:riff 
R SALT LAICE 
Official Sta tement 
S h:1ne Tl11dso11 
Dt:ru,y Chd 
/,J 01 i Ct ~ -
You arc being "51,cd to give;; :;1aterr.cnt regarding the incident being investigated uncl::.r case number --
Which is c\nssified 2s an _____ _____ _ 
76-8-504 Written False Stateinc:nt . 
A person is guilty of a class n misdcincm1or if;(~) with intent to dcc~i ·,c a public servant in the pe:·fonnancc of his official funct ion, he: a ) tv! akcs any 
written false sla,cment which he does not believe !O be rr:i,1c. 
I hav:.: rci!d nncl und~rsttind the nbov~ wan,ing. 
\il i111~s~; by: 
DOB: 
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